Article VI of the NPT declares that all signatory states to the Treaty shall work towards complete nuclear disarmament “under strict and effective international control.” However, it certainly has been argued plenty of times in the past that the language of Article VI in particular, and the NPT more broadly, is vague and non-binding enough as to simply encourage member states to “negotiate in good faith,” and not to make measurable, verifiable progress on nonproliferation and towards disarmament.
This ambiguity in language, coupled with a lack of institutionalized enforcement mechanisms, makes working measurably towards disarmament very difficult. Witness North Korea’s development of civilian nuclear capabilities, achieved in complete legality under Article IV of the NPT, prior to the country’s withdrawal from the non-proliferation regime in 2003 to convert their technology from civilian to military use. Further, by claiming legitimacy to develop its nuclear program as a response to the failure of the recognized nuclear weapons states to uphold their obligations under the NPT, Iran has continued its progress towards realizing its nuclear ambition. And let's not even get into India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs, both developed in complete defiance of the international community's urging and of UN mandates.
So it seems a "voluntary" treaty like the NPT isn't good enough to anchor the global nonproliferation regime. So perhaps a more “mandatory” regime that relies heavily on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and that is backed by strict enforcement mechanisms, would ideally curb proliferation from aspiring nuclear countries and deter those countries on the brink from developing full-fledged nuclear weapons programs. Jack Garvey does a good job of breaking down a carefully-thought-out plan here. I highly recommend you check it out.
Chapter VII would basically constitute nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace, and under that definition, the UN Security Council would then have the international legal right and obligation to leverage diplomatic and, if necessary, military actions against states that pose a risk to international security.
So through the employment of Chapter VII, recognized nuclear weapons states would face more pressure to measurably and verifiably disarm, as failure to do so would incur severe penalties, including strict economic sanctions. In the meantime, states desiring to join the nuclear club would face the same threat of sanctions, as well as possible UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force, as justified under Chapter VII, since any actual or potential instance of nuclear proliferation would constitute a threat to the peace.
But while a formalized and “mandatory” regime endorsed and administered by the UN Security Council would be more effective than the current consensual regime, I think that alone would be insufficient. In tandem with a formal, institutionalized set of norms and laws, we also need ad hoc programs that can facilitate a quicker and freer flow of information, which can often allow action to be taken much more rapidly than if using proper channels. In short, ad hoc institutions are unburdened by the parameters of international organizations in nonproliferation efforts, and include, amongst others, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); the Cooperative Threat Reduction; and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
Here's a vivid recent example of the success of such measures: let's look at the role of the PSI in interdicting a shipment of uranium-enrichment equipment bound for Libya in 2003. Within a few months of the interdiction, and following secret talks amongst Libyan, American and British officials, Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi announced that he would no longer pursue a nuclear weapons program for his country. US officials were quick to cite the work of the PSI in inciting Libya to give up its nuclear ambitions; if that is true, then perhaps the reason the PSI was so effective is because generally, ad hoc mechanisms can enable military and diplomatic institutions to mobilize more quickly than would the structured, formal processes of the United Nations.
So a more "mandatory" architecture certainly would strengthen the nonproliferation regime in the following ways:
- It would more forcefully deter nuclear would-be states from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities.
- It would lend a greater sense of legitimacy to the matter of proliferation by declaring the issue a threat to international peace under Chapter VII.
- It would change the negotiating game with targeted states and strengthen the effectiveness of IAEA inspection and verification measures.
