Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
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This article will be short, but hopefully to the point: New START must be ratified because right now, and as of December 6 of last year, we can no longer see inside the Russian nuclear complex, and we don't know what's going on there.
In order to succeed, arms control -- unlike any other international issue -- requires the type of verification of compliance, commitment and mutual cooperation that can only be assured through the formal institution of a legally-binding treaty. Climate change, trade, human rights, even maritime issues -- commitment to any and all of these can be monitored and measured in so many ways, whether one brings a treaty into force or not.
But the very nature of arms control -- which entails reducing one's nuclear warheads and delivery systems, which are intended to defend a nation and its territory -- means that the ability, and more importantly the incentive, to cheat are significantly higher.
START I, which entered into force on December 5, 1994, allowed the United States to put into place verification mechanisms, including the presence of on-the-ground inspectors, to ensure there would be no cheating within the post-Cold War Russian system. Combined with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, this effort had tremendous success over the past 15 years -- not only in reducing the global danger posed by nuclear weapons, but also in building confidence between Russia and the United States through enhanced transparency.
START I expired on December 5 of last year, and as of next Sunday it will have been a full 365 days since we have had that on-the-ground presence in Russia to continue the verification work that is absolutely critical to bilateral nonproliferation efforts.
We need New START because it would allow us to restore our monitoring and verification mechanisms in Russia. It's pretty simple. No other issue is more critical to national and global security in the immediate term than this.
11.29.2010
11.01.2010
Our Chance on New START Is Slipping Away
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
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Tomorrow, November 2, is midterm election day in the US, and by nearly all credible accounts, the Republican party seems poised to make big gains when voters go to the polls. Interestingly, this time around these victories will be based overwhelmingly on domestic issues -- namely the economy and jobs creation. A quick look at thesmear ad campaigns right here in the state of Massachusetts shows that candidates are focused on things like tax cuts, unemployment, education, and the overall state of the economy. There is little to no focus on national security or foreign policy issues. You see neither incumbents nor contenders discussing Iran, North Korea, terrorism, Afghanistan / Iraq, or climate change.
One shouldn't be surprised, then, to see New START -- a treaty that nearly everyone endorses, from former Secretaries of State and Defense to the former commanders of both Strategic Air Command and STRATCOM -- getting such little attention in the run-up to these critical elections. Moreover, the chances of New START being ratified by the Senate, which are already slim-to-none in the lame-duck session between November and January, will become even more minuscule once Congress begins its new session in 2011.
It is difficult to overstate the significant degree to which current and former policymakers have endorsed New START. Politicians on both sides of the aisle, from Senator John Kerry (D-MA and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R-CA) agree that New START will continue a legacy of mutual, phased and verifiable arms control measures that were first set out and implemented by the Reagan administration. Moreover, New START is sensible because it is a confidence-building measure, and particularly after Russia's nuclear saber-rattling during George W. Bush's second term, such measures are absolutely necessary to promote good relations between the two former Cold War rivals -- who, let's not forget, still hold between them 95% of the world's nuclear weapons stockpile.
But for all its sensibility and utility as part of a long-term vision and strategy to make the world a safer place for generations to come, New START has foundered on the Senate floor. Domestic politicking, a desire on the Republican side to see the President fail, and to some degree a lingering mistrust of Russia have all presented serious obstacles to the ratification of what the Obama administration almost certainly thought would be a no-brainer. And even though it has been more than six months since Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed it in Prague, failure to ratify New START here at home would be a devastating blow to the President's foreign policy agenda, the centerpiece of which is arms control and nonproliferation.
A trusted Washington source told me the sincere hope of the Obama administration was that New START would be signed before its predecessor treaty expired in December of 2009, and that it would be ratified well in advance of midterm elections. By this time, the President had hoped to be pushing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). So much for that.
As a citizen and somewhat informed voter, I find it frustrating when domestic resistance and political pandering get in the way of the development and progress of strong, sensible agendas. It's a shame, really, that our national security strategy and the future of our country depends on the myopic politicking of a handful of representatives who are blocking the progress of New START for all the wrong reasons.
As Governor Schwarzenegger so eloquently put it, "There are those in America that are trying to flex their muscles and pretend they're ballsy by saying, 'we've got to keep those nuclear weapons' ... [but] it's an idiot that says that. It's stupid to say that."
Amen to that.
-----
Tomorrow, November 2, is midterm election day in the US, and by nearly all credible accounts, the Republican party seems poised to make big gains when voters go to the polls. Interestingly, this time around these victories will be based overwhelmingly on domestic issues -- namely the economy and jobs creation. A quick look at the
One shouldn't be surprised, then, to see New START -- a treaty that nearly everyone endorses, from former Secretaries of State and Defense to the former commanders of both Strategic Air Command and STRATCOM -- getting such little attention in the run-up to these critical elections. Moreover, the chances of New START being ratified by the Senate, which are already slim-to-none in the lame-duck session between November and January, will become even more minuscule once Congress begins its new session in 2011.
It is difficult to overstate the significant degree to which current and former policymakers have endorsed New START. Politicians on both sides of the aisle, from Senator John Kerry (D-MA and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R-CA) agree that New START will continue a legacy of mutual, phased and verifiable arms control measures that were first set out and implemented by the Reagan administration. Moreover, New START is sensible because it is a confidence-building measure, and particularly after Russia's nuclear saber-rattling during George W. Bush's second term, such measures are absolutely necessary to promote good relations between the two former Cold War rivals -- who, let's not forget, still hold between them 95% of the world's nuclear weapons stockpile.
But for all its sensibility and utility as part of a long-term vision and strategy to make the world a safer place for generations to come, New START has foundered on the Senate floor. Domestic politicking, a desire on the Republican side to see the President fail, and to some degree a lingering mistrust of Russia have all presented serious obstacles to the ratification of what the Obama administration almost certainly thought would be a no-brainer. And even though it has been more than six months since Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed it in Prague, failure to ratify New START here at home would be a devastating blow to the President's foreign policy agenda, the centerpiece of which is arms control and nonproliferation.
A trusted Washington source told me the sincere hope of the Obama administration was that New START would be signed before its predecessor treaty expired in December of 2009, and that it would be ratified well in advance of midterm elections. By this time, the President had hoped to be pushing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). So much for that.
As a citizen and somewhat informed voter, I find it frustrating when domestic resistance and political pandering get in the way of the development and progress of strong, sensible agendas. It's a shame, really, that our national security strategy and the future of our country depends on the myopic politicking of a handful of representatives who are blocking the progress of New START for all the wrong reasons.
As Governor Schwarzenegger so eloquently put it, "There are those in America that are trying to flex their muscles and pretend they're ballsy by saying, 'we've got to keep those nuclear weapons' ... [but] it's an idiot that says that. It's stupid to say that."
Amen to that.
10.07.2010
Venezuela Is Going Nuclear, and We Should Be Worried
UPDATE, Oct. 9 2010: Thanks to all who have read and commented. I feel that I would be remiss to not provide some clarification on my own position regarding this article and its substantive arguments.
In my writing, I do say that Venezuela's potential for developing a nuclear weapons program is based on the yet-to-be-confirmed accuracy of the article written by Roger Noriega. It's important that I make clear, and that readers understand, that what Noriega says very well may be based on speculation, less-than-investigative journalism, and/or hearsay. It is of course wise to wait until more substantial evidence is presented to confirm Noriega's report. Nonetheless, important questions are raised regarding the openness or lack thereof of Venezuela's nuclear program.
Moreover, while I am aware that Venezuela is not geographically south of the equator, I am emphasizing here its commitment to the Latin American nuclear weapons free zone. It is important for the countries of the region, from a nonproliferation framework perspective, that the integrity of this and identical NWFZs across the southern hemisphere be maintained, as such agreements do serve to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.
Finally, as an individual studying and writing on nuclear issues, I am deeply committed to nonproliferation principles, and I believe I make this quite clear in my introductory and concluding paragraphs. I am not at all interested in the ideological issues that have been brought up in the comments. To clarify, I am neither a neo-conservative (please read past articles on HuffPo and on my own website) nor a Chávez-basher, but I am always interested in any and all countries, including Venezuela and Iran, that are developing or are interested in nuclear infrastructure development.
Thanks for reading.
-------
You may know that the entire world, south of the equator, is one huge nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ). You may also know that the very first region of the world to come up with the concept of a NWFZ is Latin America. But what you may not know, until you read this eye-opening and chilling article by Roger Noriega, is that this delicate balance of NWFZs in the southern hemisphere is about to be upended by Hugo Chávez, with the help of his trusty friend Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
A little background: Nuclear weapon free zones are an important component of what we today call the global nonproliferation regime, the cornerstone of which is the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NWFZs not only serve as confidence-building measures amongst countries within a given region, but provide their members with legally binding negative security assurances from the five recognized nuclear weapons states. They arguably promote the overall security and stability of a region -- as nuclear weapons are overwhelmingly destabilizing tools -- and contribute to the objective of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.
As early as 1958, countries in Latin America were discussing arms control agreements, which would include a ban on nuclear weapons. As a result of those discussions, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was presented in 1967 and then entered into force two years later. Venezuela has been a member of the Latin American NWFZ since March 1970, but in the past few years has been showing signs of breaking with convention and going rogue.
Since 2007, Venezuela has been exploring the idea of developing its own indigenous nuclear infrastructure. Moreover, there is compelling evidence that Venezuela's government and banks, with the help of the Ahmadinejad government and Iranian shell companies, are providing Iran with uranium mined in southeastern Venezuela -- which, if true, would be a blatant violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 prohibiting Iranian engagement in "uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology." And there are additional anecdotes, as detailed in Noriega's article, that lend credibility to the idea that Venezuela is interested specifically in nuclear weapons and not just civilian nuclear energy.
If the information available to us so far is accurate, we might be looking at having two more states join the nine nuclear weapons powers -- four of which are not even recognized under the NPT. Iran would be number 10, as by all informed and detailed accounts it is pursuing more than just nuclear power, and Venezuela might not be too far behind as number 11. And if they do acquire weapons capability, the irony of Iran and Venezuela would also be reflected in the demonstrated failure of the global nonproliferation regime: both of them currently belong to the NPT, and yet are developing their capabilities while within that framework, à la North Korea.
At the same time, there is little "we" (the international community) can really do, from a legal or extralegal standpoint, beyond passing additional Security Council resolutions or using strong and compelling rhetoric. Nonetheless, we need to make use of all available political, diplomatic, economic and legal channels to prevent Venezuela from developing a nuclear weapons capability, going rogue, upsetting the balance of the Latin American NWFZ, and punching yet another hole in an already weather-beaten global nonproliferation framework.
In my writing, I do say that Venezuela's potential for developing a nuclear weapons program is based on the yet-to-be-confirmed accuracy of the article written by Roger Noriega. It's important that I make clear, and that readers understand, that what Noriega says very well may be based on speculation, less-than-investigative journalism, and/or hearsay. It is of course wise to wait until more substantial evidence is presented to confirm Noriega's report. Nonetheless, important questions are raised regarding the openness or lack thereof of Venezuela's nuclear program.
Moreover, while I am aware that Venezuela is not geographically south of the equator, I am emphasizing here its commitment to the Latin American nuclear weapons free zone. It is important for the countries of the region, from a nonproliferation framework perspective, that the integrity of this and identical NWFZs across the southern hemisphere be maintained, as such agreements do serve to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.
Finally, as an individual studying and writing on nuclear issues, I am deeply committed to nonproliferation principles, and I believe I make this quite clear in my introductory and concluding paragraphs. I am not at all interested in the ideological issues that have been brought up in the comments. To clarify, I am neither a neo-conservative (please read past articles on HuffPo and on my own website) nor a Chávez-basher, but I am always interested in any and all countries, including Venezuela and Iran, that are developing or are interested in nuclear infrastructure development.
Thanks for reading.
-------
You may know that the entire world, south of the equator, is one huge nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ). You may also know that the very first region of the world to come up with the concept of a NWFZ is Latin America. But what you may not know, until you read this eye-opening and chilling article by Roger Noriega, is that this delicate balance of NWFZs in the southern hemisphere is about to be upended by Hugo Chávez, with the help of his trusty friend Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
A little background: Nuclear weapon free zones are an important component of what we today call the global nonproliferation regime, the cornerstone of which is the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NWFZs not only serve as confidence-building measures amongst countries within a given region, but provide their members with legally binding negative security assurances from the five recognized nuclear weapons states. They arguably promote the overall security and stability of a region -- as nuclear weapons are overwhelmingly destabilizing tools -- and contribute to the objective of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.
As early as 1958, countries in Latin America were discussing arms control agreements, which would include a ban on nuclear weapons. As a result of those discussions, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was presented in 1967 and then entered into force two years later. Venezuela has been a member of the Latin American NWFZ since March 1970, but in the past few years has been showing signs of breaking with convention and going rogue.
Since 2007, Venezuela has been exploring the idea of developing its own indigenous nuclear infrastructure. Moreover, there is compelling evidence that Venezuela's government and banks, with the help of the Ahmadinejad government and Iranian shell companies, are providing Iran with uranium mined in southeastern Venezuela -- which, if true, would be a blatant violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 prohibiting Iranian engagement in "uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology." And there are additional anecdotes, as detailed in Noriega's article, that lend credibility to the idea that Venezuela is interested specifically in nuclear weapons and not just civilian nuclear energy.
If the information available to us so far is accurate, we might be looking at having two more states join the nine nuclear weapons powers -- four of which are not even recognized under the NPT. Iran would be number 10, as by all informed and detailed accounts it is pursuing more than just nuclear power, and Venezuela might not be too far behind as number 11. And if they do acquire weapons capability, the irony of Iran and Venezuela would also be reflected in the demonstrated failure of the global nonproliferation regime: both of them currently belong to the NPT, and yet are developing their capabilities while within that framework, à la North Korea.
At the same time, there is little "we" (the international community) can really do, from a legal or extralegal standpoint, beyond passing additional Security Council resolutions or using strong and compelling rhetoric. Nonetheless, we need to make use of all available political, diplomatic, economic and legal channels to prevent Venezuela from developing a nuclear weapons capability, going rogue, upsetting the balance of the Latin American NWFZ, and punching yet another hole in an already weather-beaten global nonproliferation framework.
9.30.2010
The US Defense Establishment Is Tied Inextricably to China
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
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This might be old hat to others, but this morning I read a fascinating and eye-opening Businessweek article on the intricacies of defense acquisition for the Pentagon and how much of the essential components required to operate critical equipment -- from submarines to tanks to laser-guided smart bombs -- come from China.
In particular, China produces 97% of the world's supply of so-called "rare earth" elements, including neodymium, yttrium, dysprosium and 14 others, which have long been recognized as essential to the development of defense equipment ranging from helicopters to tank guns to missiles. These elements are bought by defense contractors who work with the US Department of Defense, including Boeing, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon. According to Brett Lambert, director of the Pentagon’s Office of Industrial Policy:
This means that in the meantime, the ability of the United States to defend itself through all three legs -- land, air and sea -- is contingent upon its continued cooperation with its largest economic rival.
In related news, the Global Security Newswire reported just earlier today that the US and China are looking to renew military ties -- an interesting juxtaposition that underlines the intricate web of government military interests and those of private-sector contractors, all within the context of international business and global politics and economics.
-----
This might be old hat to others, but this morning I read a fascinating and eye-opening Businessweek article on the intricacies of defense acquisition for the Pentagon and how much of the essential components required to operate critical equipment -- from submarines to tanks to laser-guided smart bombs -- come from China.
In particular, China produces 97% of the world's supply of so-called "rare earth" elements, including neodymium, yttrium, dysprosium and 14 others, which have long been recognized as essential to the development of defense equipment ranging from helicopters to tank guns to missiles. These elements are bought by defense contractors who work with the US Department of Defense, including Boeing, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon. According to Brett Lambert, director of the Pentagon’s Office of Industrial Policy:
The department has long recognized that rare-earth elements are important raw material inputs for many defense systems and that many companies in our base have expressed concern regarding the future availability of the refined products of these elements.That concern over future availability is driven by a recent hike in export quotas and taxes, which are driving up prices and making acquisition more costly for US defense contractors. Yet there aren't many other options: at present, it would take about 15 years for the US to rebuild a rare earths manufacturing supply chain of its own.
This means that in the meantime, the ability of the United States to defend itself through all three legs -- land, air and sea -- is contingent upon its continued cooperation with its largest economic rival.
In related news, the Global Security Newswire reported just earlier today that the US and China are looking to renew military ties -- an interesting juxtaposition that underlines the intricate web of government military interests and those of private-sector contractors, all within the context of international business and global politics and economics.
9.08.2010
When International Treaties Stall at Home
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
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Last week, I was sitting in a class on international treaty obligations and compliance with Antonia Chayes, Professor of International Politics and Law at The Fletcher School. We were discussing the difficulties of (a) ratifying an international treaty at home and (b) complying with said treaty after ratification, and I couldn't help but think of the recent news off the Global Security Newswire that Senator John Kerry (D-MA) has submitted a draft ratification resolution for New START, which was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev earlier this year.
I'm not interested here in the fine-print details of Kerry's draft proposal. Rather, what fascinates me is the degree to which domestic politics influence international relations, and vice-versa. Obama won the national election two years ago (can you believe we're already halfway through this term?) on a platform that focused on increasing American national security by lowering our reliance on nuclear weapons, especially in light of the relatively new global threat of nuclear terrorism. And, whether he deserved it or not, Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize shortly after being inaugurated. He also made some very powerful speeches, put out a forward-looking Nuclear Posture Review, and even hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit a few months ago. He actually followed through on his commitment to advance arms control talks with Russia, and one year after announcing in Prague that the United States is committed to a world free of nuclear weapons, he and Medvedev kept their promise and signed New START.
But despite all this progress and momentum, not all is good and harmonious on the nuclear front. Things have stalled here at home, and from the beginning, New START in particular has faced a steep uphill battle from Senators on both sides of the party divide, though the more vocal opponents are Republican. And given that national Congressional elections are just two months away, and that the President's national approval ratings have dropped by over 20 percentage points since he took office, people are clamoring for change -- and our elected officials are all too happy to pander to those interests. From playing on electorate fears to just giving the people what they want to hear, many of our Representatives and Senators are losing sight of the big picture. They think ratifying New START would undermine national security, would cut funding for critical defense projects, and would make us appear to the rest of the world as weak apologists who are all too eager to disarm unilaterally.
The reality is precisely the opposite. Our Congressmen and women really could learn a lot from paying attention to smart people like James Acton at the Carnegie Endowment, who writes that, contrary to the picture Republicans in particular are painting of the President as a naïve idealist, the Obama administration is composed of realists who understand that "the world must be made a significantly safer place before nuclear weapons are eliminated:"
Just today, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) offered a resolution text that amends Senator Kerry's draft proposal and includes verbiage that, it is hoped, will be more amenable to Republican concerns. Though I don't particularly like the provision that the United States can withdraw from the treaty if the proposed $10 billion for Obama's stockpile plan is not approved by Congress, it certainly should make the treaty more digestible for those GOP Senators who still don't believe ratification of New START is an overall good thing.
And though New START is just one example, it is a particularly salient one of an international legal phenomenon that fascinates me: Treaties are negotiated, sliced and diced, rehashed, renegotiated (with many interim iterations) and finally signed -- only to have all that progress hit a dead end when it comes to ratification and entry of said treaty into force.
What can be done, from both an international treaty negotiation perspective and a domestic political perspective, to prevent roadblocks like this from cropping up all the time? I'm open to any and all answers.
-----
Last week, I was sitting in a class on international treaty obligations and compliance with Antonia Chayes, Professor of International Politics and Law at The Fletcher School. We were discussing the difficulties of (a) ratifying an international treaty at home and (b) complying with said treaty after ratification, and I couldn't help but think of the recent news off the Global Security Newswire that Senator John Kerry (D-MA) has submitted a draft ratification resolution for New START, which was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev earlier this year.
I'm not interested here in the fine-print details of Kerry's draft proposal. Rather, what fascinates me is the degree to which domestic politics influence international relations, and vice-versa. Obama won the national election two years ago (can you believe we're already halfway through this term?) on a platform that focused on increasing American national security by lowering our reliance on nuclear weapons, especially in light of the relatively new global threat of nuclear terrorism. And, whether he deserved it or not, Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize shortly after being inaugurated. He also made some very powerful speeches, put out a forward-looking Nuclear Posture Review, and even hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit a few months ago. He actually followed through on his commitment to advance arms control talks with Russia, and one year after announcing in Prague that the United States is committed to a world free of nuclear weapons, he and Medvedev kept their promise and signed New START.
But despite all this progress and momentum, not all is good and harmonious on the nuclear front. Things have stalled here at home, and from the beginning, New START in particular has faced a steep uphill battle from Senators on both sides of the party divide, though the more vocal opponents are Republican. And given that national Congressional elections are just two months away, and that the President's national approval ratings have dropped by over 20 percentage points since he took office, people are clamoring for change -- and our elected officials are all too happy to pander to those interests. From playing on electorate fears to just giving the people what they want to hear, many of our Representatives and Senators are losing sight of the big picture. They think ratifying New START would undermine national security, would cut funding for critical defense projects, and would make us appear to the rest of the world as weak apologists who are all too eager to disarm unilaterally.
The reality is precisely the opposite. Our Congressmen and women really could learn a lot from paying attention to smart people like James Acton at the Carnegie Endowment, who writes that, contrary to the picture Republicans in particular are painting of the President as a naïve idealist, the Obama administration is composed of realists who understand that "the world must be made a significantly safer place before nuclear weapons are eliminated:"
... trying to create the conditions that would allow nuclear weapons to be safely eliminated is not “dangerous” [...] On the contrary, because a prerequisite to abolition would be much stronger bulwarks against states that violate international laws and norms -- including nonproliferation ones -- creating the conditions for abolition would significantly enhance U.S. security.Ratification of New START would be one such condition for eventual global and mutual abolition, and getting the treaty passed through Congress would actually serve to enhance national security, not erode it.
Just today, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) offered a resolution text that amends Senator Kerry's draft proposal and includes verbiage that, it is hoped, will be more amenable to Republican concerns. Though I don't particularly like the provision that the United States can withdraw from the treaty if the proposed $10 billion for Obama's stockpile plan is not approved by Congress, it certainly should make the treaty more digestible for those GOP Senators who still don't believe ratification of New START is an overall good thing.
And though New START is just one example, it is a particularly salient one of an international legal phenomenon that fascinates me: Treaties are negotiated, sliced and diced, rehashed, renegotiated (with many interim iterations) and finally signed -- only to have all that progress hit a dead end when it comes to ratification and entry of said treaty into force.
What can be done, from both an international treaty negotiation perspective and a domestic political perspective, to prevent roadblocks like this from cropping up all the time? I'm open to any and all answers.
9.01.2010
Why Muslims Should Support Nuclear Weapons Disarmament
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
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Sadly, though the current fixation of national debate is still the "Ground Zero Mosque," public opinion polls indicate that American sentiment towards the bomb has become ambivalent, and most recently, dangerously lukewarm -- something I discussed in my piece last week.
But the issue can be refocused in a spiritual light and bring to the ongoing debate on nuclear weapons an angle and voice that were notably absent for the duration of the Cold War.
An excellent interview was published today in the U.S. News & World Report with the Rev. Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, an evangelical Christian and founder of the Two Futures Project. According to the website, the Project is:
And that would truly be joining in this work to the glory of God.
-----
Sadly, though the current fixation of national debate is still the "Ground Zero Mosque," public opinion polls indicate that American sentiment towards the bomb has become ambivalent, and most recently, dangerously lukewarm -- something I discussed in my piece last week.
But the issue can be refocused in a spiritual light and bring to the ongoing debate on nuclear weapons an angle and voice that were notably absent for the duration of the Cold War.
An excellent interview was published today in the U.S. News & World Report with the Rev. Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, an evangelical Christian and founder of the Two Futures Project. According to the website, the Project is:
... a movement of American Christians for the abolition of all nuclear weapons ... We support concrete and practical steps to reduce nuclear dangers immediately, while pursuing the multilateral, global, irreversible, and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, as a biblically-grounded mandate and as a contemporary security imperative ... By joining together with one voice of Christian conscience, we seek to encourage and enable our national leaders to make the complete elimination of nuclear weapons the organizing principle of American nuclear weapons policy. We join in this work to the glory of God. [emphasis added]I think this is not only absolutely fascinating, it is absolutely necessary. The strategy of the Two Futures Project -- to re-establish a 45-year-long debate on nuclear weapons, historically devoid of religion and faith-based morality altogether, in a contemporary understanding of what it means to be a loving, caring, responsible Christian -- is to be commended. In his interview with U.S. News, the Reverend lays it out very neatly:
From my point of view, there's no legitimate theological basis in the Bible for Christians to justify the killing of innocents. Nuclear weapons also violate the "just war" criteria, for instance. They don't discriminate between innocents and non-innocents, and they are disproportionate. With that theological conviction, there are only two futures: a world in which nuclear weapons are used, and one in which they are abolished. For me, the choice is easy.For moderate and intellectual Muslims as well, the choice should be simple: either annihilate the human race or eliminate the global threat posed by nuclear weapons. Believe it or not -- and I know I'm opening up a big hole here -- there is plenty of talk in the Qur'an about being good, kind, righteous, giving and generous to one's fellow man, regardless of religious creed. Please note that while the following translations come from Abdullah Yusuf Ali, a renowned Qur'anic scholar, the interpretations thereof are completely mine. A few examples:
O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other)). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things). --Qur'an 49:13Here's another one, one of my favorite passages, that discusses what righteousness really is:
It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces towards east or West; but it is righteousness- to believe in Allah and the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Book, and the Messengers; to spend of your substance, out of love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayer, and practice regular charity; to fulfill the contracts which ye have made; and to be firm and patient, in pain (or suffering) and adversity, and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth, the Allah-fearing. --Qur'an 2:177And finally, a passage that gives credibility to my argument that moderate Muslims should have no problem with, and in fact should support, the Two Futures Project:
Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians,- any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. --Qur'an 2:62Hence, and in light of these verses, it is my (admittedly simplistic) conclusion that when it comes to threats to humanity, there should be a Muslim voice to join hands with that of Christians who support the Two Futures Project -- a voice that is grounded in the realities of our time, that is forward-looking and hopeful, that understands Islam to be a faith of peace and an integral part of the Abrahamic tradition and experience, and that advocates for the salvation and dignity of all human life, irrespective of belief or creed.
And that would truly be joining in this work to the glory of God.
8.23.2010
Ratifying the CTBT Is Absolutely Necessary
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
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Why do we sometimes ignore facts and stubbornly continue to believe in falsehoods?
A quick example: Not that I'd have a problem with it if he were, but President Obama is not a Muslim. Yet an unsettling percentage of Americans still believe he is. In March of this year, Harris found that overall, 32% of those polled believe President Obama is a Muslim. Five months later, the Pew Research Center released the results of its poll and found that a full 18% of respondents believe the same thing.
So, if sample and survey methodologies are intact, with a high degree of confidence, and if we can in fact make fair and accurate inferences about the American people based on these and other surveys, then we can conclude that at least a fifth of the American people believe in something that simply isn't true. Yet we persist in clinging to debunked myths.
Which brings me to my point: This Sunday, August 29, marks the first International Day Against Nuclear Tests, passed by the UN General Assembly in December 2009 to promote the total elimination of nuclear weapons testing, with a view to one day globally ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
And although President Obama has made the reduction of the global nuclear threat one of his top-priority foreign policy objectives, and despite the fact that the United States hasn't conducted a nuclear test of any sort since September 1992, Congress has yet to approve and ratify the CTBT, which was signed by the US in 1996.
Though the matter of ratifying the CTBT here at home and bringing it into force requires other nations to do the same in order to make it an internationally legally binding treaty, domestic politics of course have a tremendous hand in shaping the outcome of proposed Congressional bills. The CTBT, like many other proposals, is subject to the influence of the American people, who continue to believe that the United States needs nuclear weapons and therefore should retain its testing capabilities.
Earlier this month, Rasmussen released the results of a survey which revealed that a full 77% of those polled believe the US nuclear arsenal is important to national security, with more than half (57%) saying the US should not reduce the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Moreover, nearly half of all respondents (46%) feel the United States should actually continue developing new nuclear weapons.
Compare these statistics to a 2004 survey conducted by the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, in which it was found that 65% of respondents (including 54% of Republicans) felt it is NOT necessary for the US to develop new nuclear weapons.
So it seems public opinion is once again shifting away from advocacy for decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons in foreign policy and statesmanship, and back towards dependence on weapons development and testing to ensure a credible and sustained level of deterrence. Which is deplorable, since the threat against which we can effectively "deter" is no longer the nation-state as a political entity, but rather amorphous terrorist groups that operate across national boundaries and therefore are much harder to target, either in prevention or retaliation.
If anything, this change in the nature of the nuclear threat should give our legislators more reason to push for ratification of the CTBT, since bringing this treaty into force is a critical component of a long-term, forward-looking plan to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world. And as the President continues working with Russian and other world leaders to mitigate the global nuclear threat, one thing all of us here at home can do is to make our voices heard by calling our Congressional representatives and telling them that ratification of the CTBT is a necessary step to prevent non-state actors from acquiring and using a nuclear weapon.
It is true that the CTBT in and of itself will not lessen the nuclear threat in any immediate or tangible way. But in looking at the big picture, we should understand that the only way to prevent nuclear terrorism from ever becoming a reality is to address this double-headed problem at its sources. And while the world's armed forces and intelligence agencies work every day to stop terrorism, the other half of the problem -- the actual nuclear weapons, materials, and delivery systems that terrorist groups covet -- must be addressed simultaneously.
Take away a nuke, and that's one less opportunity for the bad guys to get a hold of one and detonate it over a major city, American or otherwise, with nearly complete impunity.
Now, more than ever, and in anticipation of the upcoming International Day Against Nuclear Tests, let's again ask ourselves why CTBT ratification hasn't happened yet, and work to finally make it a reality. The polls show that most Americans still favor reliance on nuclear arsenals to guarantee our national security. Yet, sadly and ironically, this dependence actually weakens our security. Though it would be a small one, having the CTBT come into force would nonetheless be a significant step in the right direction once again.
And that's something we can all believe in.
-----
Why do we sometimes ignore facts and stubbornly continue to believe in falsehoods?
A quick example: Not that I'd have a problem with it if he were, but President Obama is not a Muslim. Yet an unsettling percentage of Americans still believe he is. In March of this year, Harris found that overall, 32% of those polled believe President Obama is a Muslim. Five months later, the Pew Research Center released the results of its poll and found that a full 18% of respondents believe the same thing.
So, if sample and survey methodologies are intact, with a high degree of confidence, and if we can in fact make fair and accurate inferences about the American people based on these and other surveys, then we can conclude that at least a fifth of the American people believe in something that simply isn't true. Yet we persist in clinging to debunked myths.
Which brings me to my point: This Sunday, August 29, marks the first International Day Against Nuclear Tests, passed by the UN General Assembly in December 2009 to promote the total elimination of nuclear weapons testing, with a view to one day globally ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
And although President Obama has made the reduction of the global nuclear threat one of his top-priority foreign policy objectives, and despite the fact that the United States hasn't conducted a nuclear test of any sort since September 1992, Congress has yet to approve and ratify the CTBT, which was signed by the US in 1996.
Though the matter of ratifying the CTBT here at home and bringing it into force requires other nations to do the same in order to make it an internationally legally binding treaty, domestic politics of course have a tremendous hand in shaping the outcome of proposed Congressional bills. The CTBT, like many other proposals, is subject to the influence of the American people, who continue to believe that the United States needs nuclear weapons and therefore should retain its testing capabilities.
Earlier this month, Rasmussen released the results of a survey which revealed that a full 77% of those polled believe the US nuclear arsenal is important to national security, with more than half (57%) saying the US should not reduce the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Moreover, nearly half of all respondents (46%) feel the United States should actually continue developing new nuclear weapons.
Compare these statistics to a 2004 survey conducted by the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, in which it was found that 65% of respondents (including 54% of Republicans) felt it is NOT necessary for the US to develop new nuclear weapons.
So it seems public opinion is once again shifting away from advocacy for decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons in foreign policy and statesmanship, and back towards dependence on weapons development and testing to ensure a credible and sustained level of deterrence. Which is deplorable, since the threat against which we can effectively "deter" is no longer the nation-state as a political entity, but rather amorphous terrorist groups that operate across national boundaries and therefore are much harder to target, either in prevention or retaliation.
If anything, this change in the nature of the nuclear threat should give our legislators more reason to push for ratification of the CTBT, since bringing this treaty into force is a critical component of a long-term, forward-looking plan to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world. And as the President continues working with Russian and other world leaders to mitigate the global nuclear threat, one thing all of us here at home can do is to make our voices heard by calling our Congressional representatives and telling them that ratification of the CTBT is a necessary step to prevent non-state actors from acquiring and using a nuclear weapon.
It is true that the CTBT in and of itself will not lessen the nuclear threat in any immediate or tangible way. But in looking at the big picture, we should understand that the only way to prevent nuclear terrorism from ever becoming a reality is to address this double-headed problem at its sources. And while the world's armed forces and intelligence agencies work every day to stop terrorism, the other half of the problem -- the actual nuclear weapons, materials, and delivery systems that terrorist groups covet -- must be addressed simultaneously.
Take away a nuke, and that's one less opportunity for the bad guys to get a hold of one and detonate it over a major city, American or otherwise, with nearly complete impunity.
Now, more than ever, and in anticipation of the upcoming International Day Against Nuclear Tests, let's again ask ourselves why CTBT ratification hasn't happened yet, and work to finally make it a reality. The polls show that most Americans still favor reliance on nuclear arsenals to guarantee our national security. Yet, sadly and ironically, this dependence actually weakens our security. Though it would be a small one, having the CTBT come into force would nonetheless be a significant step in the right direction once again.
And that's something we can all believe in.
8.12.2010
The Nuclear [Movie] Renaissance, or: Bad Idea, James Cameron
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
-----
I'm noticing what might be a curious trend lately in Hollywood: movies are being made about nuclear weapons again. Much like the so-called "nuclear renaissance," which captures the current renewed global interest in nuclear power to address energy needs, there seems to be a revitalization of interest in making movies about nuclear weapons.
Take, for example, the star-studded, Lucky Walker-directed Countdown to Zero, produced by Lawrence Bender of Inglourious Basterds and An Inconvenient Truth. Also, there's Nuclear Tipping Point, a much more sober, History Channel-style film released this year by former Senator Sam Nunn's Nuclear Threat Initiative organization. And then there are smaller films produced by activist groups and non-profit organizations, like the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's U.S. Leadership for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World, which can be ordered for free.
But going back over 60 years, one of the earliest nuclear-themed films was the 1949 French movie, La Bataille de L'Eau Lourde, or The Battle For the Heavy Water. It's a fascinating story, based on actual events, about how a daring group of French physicists played a pivotal role in preventing Adolf Hitler from developing the world's first nuclear bomb. The real-life story is so incredible, I have to share it here:
Before the Manhattan Project in the United States ever took off, there was the German Uranverein, a group of brilliant nuclear physicists dedicated to exploring revolutionary concepts of fission in uranium atoms. Their wartime objective: to develop the German nuclear program, and to, at the very least, successfully sustain a nuclear chain reaction.
Quickly the Uranverein realized that they needed some way to moderate the chain reaction -- that is, to be able to slow down the speed at which already fast-moving neutrons hit other uranium atoms, since a neutron moving too quickly would pass right through a uranium atom without splitting it. The physicists decided on heavy water as a medium, which would slow down neutrons just enough to sustain a chain reaction. At the time, however, the only place in Europe creating heavy water was a fertilizer plant in Vemork, Norway that was producing it as a by-product.
By this time, French physicist and Nobel laureate Frédéric Joliot-Curie (son-in-law of Marie Curie) had identified the potential use of heavy water in uranium fission as well, and informed the French Ministry of Armaments of its importance in nuclear research. When approached by a representative of the French government, the managing director of the Vemork plant handed his entire supply of by-product heavy water over to France at no cost, saying: "Our company will accept not one centime for the product you are taking, if it will aid France's victory."
A total of 185 kilos of heavy water was smuggled eventually to Paris in the spring of 1940. But in May and June, as Nazi forces advanced on France and marched towards Paris, it became apparent that the heavy water, which still was crucial to the development of the German atomic program, could not be allowed to fall into enemy hands. So a group of French scientists, carrying the heavy water in jerrycans, embarked on a perilous journey to deliver the precious cargo into British hands.
Fortunately, they completed their mission, and the Allies were thus able to thwart, not for the first time, Germany's attempts to develop its nuclear program.
Nine years later, the French film La Bataille de L'Eau Lourde was produced, starring -- believe it or not -- many of the original physicists playing themselves. I've been trying to find a copy of this old black-and-white; if anyone has any leads, please contact me.
But back to the topic of movies. What prompted me to write this piece was yesterday's news that James Cameron is revisiting a script that he had optioned earlier this year, for a movie based on the Charles Pellegrino book Last Train From Hiroshima. It recounts the journey of the only person officially recognized to survive both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, Tsutomu Yamaguchi, who passed away in January of this year at the age of 93.
Yamaguchi-san had become a vocal proponent for nuclear disarmament, and his story has been told by Japanese filmmaker Hideo Nakamura in Twice Bombed Twice Survived, as well as in Pellegrino's book. He was our generation's reminder of the horror nuclear weapons can unleash, and his death this year gave us reason both to remember his terrifying experience and to ask ourselves again why these weapons still play such a tremendous role in our and other nations' defense strategies.
I think this movie idea is going too far. Remember, Cameron is the guy who brought us Avatar, which, though it was entertaining, could hardly be called social commentary. And he's credited for creating the Terminator series, Aliens, and, of course, Titanic -- which no one remembers now as an historically accurate account of the tragic sinking of the cruise ship, but rather focuses on a romance that transcends social class divides and is most famous for Leo DiCaprio's famous line, "I'm king of the world!"
Aside from the 1949 French film, the recent spate of nuclear-themed movies is a serious look at the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. I have a feeling James Cameron would take the Pellegrino book, which already has an alarming number of falsifications, and will turn it into a mega-blockbuster with a romance-driven plot that either minimizes or completely ignores the real issue, which is the horror of the atomic bomb.
If Cameron seriously does Last Train, it had better be done well. I, for one, am not holding my breath.
-----
I'm noticing what might be a curious trend lately in Hollywood: movies are being made about nuclear weapons again. Much like the so-called "nuclear renaissance," which captures the current renewed global interest in nuclear power to address energy needs, there seems to be a revitalization of interest in making movies about nuclear weapons.
Take, for example, the star-studded, Lucky Walker-directed Countdown to Zero, produced by Lawrence Bender of Inglourious Basterds and An Inconvenient Truth. Also, there's Nuclear Tipping Point, a much more sober, History Channel-style film released this year by former Senator Sam Nunn's Nuclear Threat Initiative organization. And then there are smaller films produced by activist groups and non-profit organizations, like the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's U.S. Leadership for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World, which can be ordered for free.
But going back over 60 years, one of the earliest nuclear-themed films was the 1949 French movie, La Bataille de L'Eau Lourde, or The Battle For the Heavy Water. It's a fascinating story, based on actual events, about how a daring group of French physicists played a pivotal role in preventing Adolf Hitler from developing the world's first nuclear bomb. The real-life story is so incredible, I have to share it here:
Before the Manhattan Project in the United States ever took off, there was the German Uranverein, a group of brilliant nuclear physicists dedicated to exploring revolutionary concepts of fission in uranium atoms. Their wartime objective: to develop the German nuclear program, and to, at the very least, successfully sustain a nuclear chain reaction.
Quickly the Uranverein realized that they needed some way to moderate the chain reaction -- that is, to be able to slow down the speed at which already fast-moving neutrons hit other uranium atoms, since a neutron moving too quickly would pass right through a uranium atom without splitting it. The physicists decided on heavy water as a medium, which would slow down neutrons just enough to sustain a chain reaction. At the time, however, the only place in Europe creating heavy water was a fertilizer plant in Vemork, Norway that was producing it as a by-product.
By this time, French physicist and Nobel laureate Frédéric Joliot-Curie (son-in-law of Marie Curie) had identified the potential use of heavy water in uranium fission as well, and informed the French Ministry of Armaments of its importance in nuclear research. When approached by a representative of the French government, the managing director of the Vemork plant handed his entire supply of by-product heavy water over to France at no cost, saying: "Our company will accept not one centime for the product you are taking, if it will aid France's victory."
A total of 185 kilos of heavy water was smuggled eventually to Paris in the spring of 1940. But in May and June, as Nazi forces advanced on France and marched towards Paris, it became apparent that the heavy water, which still was crucial to the development of the German atomic program, could not be allowed to fall into enemy hands. So a group of French scientists, carrying the heavy water in jerrycans, embarked on a perilous journey to deliver the precious cargo into British hands.
Fortunately, they completed their mission, and the Allies were thus able to thwart, not for the first time, Germany's attempts to develop its nuclear program.
Nine years later, the French film La Bataille de L'Eau Lourde was produced, starring -- believe it or not -- many of the original physicists playing themselves. I've been trying to find a copy of this old black-and-white; if anyone has any leads, please contact me.
But back to the topic of movies. What prompted me to write this piece was yesterday's news that James Cameron is revisiting a script that he had optioned earlier this year, for a movie based on the Charles Pellegrino book Last Train From Hiroshima. It recounts the journey of the only person officially recognized to survive both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, Tsutomu Yamaguchi, who passed away in January of this year at the age of 93.
Yamaguchi-san had become a vocal proponent for nuclear disarmament, and his story has been told by Japanese filmmaker Hideo Nakamura in Twice Bombed Twice Survived, as well as in Pellegrino's book. He was our generation's reminder of the horror nuclear weapons can unleash, and his death this year gave us reason both to remember his terrifying experience and to ask ourselves again why these weapons still play such a tremendous role in our and other nations' defense strategies.
I think this movie idea is going too far. Remember, Cameron is the guy who brought us Avatar, which, though it was entertaining, could hardly be called social commentary. And he's credited for creating the Terminator series, Aliens, and, of course, Titanic -- which no one remembers now as an historically accurate account of the tragic sinking of the cruise ship, but rather focuses on a romance that transcends social class divides and is most famous for Leo DiCaprio's famous line, "I'm king of the world!"
Aside from the 1949 French film, the recent spate of nuclear-themed movies is a serious look at the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. I have a feeling James Cameron would take the Pellegrino book, which already has an alarming number of falsifications, and will turn it into a mega-blockbuster with a romance-driven plot that either minimizes or completely ignores the real issue, which is the horror of the atomic bomb.
If Cameron seriously does Last Train, it had better be done well. I, for one, am not holding my breath.
8.05.2010
Hiroshima, 9/11 and the Proposed NYC Mosque
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
-----
Tomorrow, August 6, marks the 65th anniversary of the US nuclear bombing of Hiroshima. On that day, and in the coming weeks and months as a result of the ensuing fire and radiation, 140,000 Japanese civilians died. An additional 80,000 would perish in Nagasaki, when three days later the US dropped another nuclear weapon there.
But body count and civilian status aside, these two events in 1945 sparked a terrifying arms race spanning over four decades, the consequences of which we are still dealing with today. And for the first time ever, the United States will send an official delegation, led by US Ambassador to Japan John Roos, to the memorial tomorrow.
Though Japan and the US have come a long way in bilateral relations since World War II, there are still some in Japan who feel they are owed, at the very least, an apology by the US government. Says one elderly Japanese woman, quoted in this article:
Of course, that's not a universal truth. And I see a clear parallel between this set of circumstances and that surrounding the current controversy in New York, as plans proceed to build a large mosque and cultural center two blocks from Ground Zero.
One warm September morning nearly a decade ago, our resolve as a nation was tested, and we rallied. Our commander-in-chief swore to "take the fight to the enemy." But he was also rational: President Bush stated, time and again, that "the enemy" was not Islam as a religion, nor the billions of Muslims worldwide who adhere to the faith in all its forms. No, the real enemy of America was the group of twisted militant radicals who had usurped Islam for their selfish, warped cause.
Indeed, for moderate Muslims worldwide and especially for American Muslims, the enemy of America also was and always has been the enemy of Islam.
Yet, nearly a decade later, more and more honest, well-intentioned Americans are forgetting President Bush's pleas: that moderate, accepting, pluralist interpretations of Islam -- as practiced by the millions of Muslims living in the US -- are America's biggest ally in the war on terror. And nowhere is this mindlessness more evident than in the protests over the Cordoba House proposal in New York City.
Never mind that the proposed mosque location is a full two blocks away from the World Trade Center site -- a site which, in this writer's opinion, should be preserved as an eternal, non-denominational memorial to the lives lost on that tragic day in 2001. Never mind that it is not just a mosque, but an interfaith, cultural and community center with a proposed fitness center, swimming pool and performing arts space.
No, the real issue I take with the entire matter is that the group of Muslims and supporters that plans on building this center represents precisely that flavor of Islam that is America's biggest ally: an Islam that is moderate, open, accepting, peaceful, outspoken against terrorism in the name of Islam, and American in the truest sense (see this Time Magazine article here).
And inflammatory personalities like Newt Gingrich and Sarah Palin are only making matters worse. Of course, they have the right to freedom of speech, but liberty should never be equated to license. They're only serving to further stoke the anti-Muslim fire that, unfortunately, is growing and spreading more and more each day.
With all that said, these sorts of reactions are to be expected. After all, it hasn't been a full 10 years yet since 9/11, and we as a nation are still struggling with the demons that haunt us, as well as trying to find a better, more peaceful path forward. It has been 65 years since Hiroshima, and yet many Japanese believe that not only was the US in the wrong, but that all Americans to this day still believe we did the right thing by dropping two nuclear weapons on Japan. That simply is not true. Many in the US, and especially those most intimate with America's secret weapons program in the 1940s, have regretted President Truman's decision -- not only because the destructive power of the nuclear bomb was unleashed upon innocent civilians, but also because of the ensuing arms race it sparked.
We are still struggling with those demons as well. But what Americans need to do, now more than ever, is start thinking for themselves again. Listen to what someone like Sarah Palin says -- and then ask yourself if you would come to the same conclusion anyway. Is it really "against common moral sense," as she says, to build an open, moderate Islamic mosque two blocks from Ground Zero? Would we really be up in arms if a church were being proposed? Or a synagogue? Or, for that matter, a Hindu mandir or Buddhist temple? Most likely not.
Remember now, more than ever, that we are American in our values. We uphold freedom and liberty more than anything else. It is precisely our adherence to and defense of these values that have made us a strong, robust, diverse and resilient nation.
Let us not forget who we are.
-----
Tomorrow, August 6, marks the 65th anniversary of the US nuclear bombing of Hiroshima. On that day, and in the coming weeks and months as a result of the ensuing fire and radiation, 140,000 Japanese civilians died. An additional 80,000 would perish in Nagasaki, when three days later the US dropped another nuclear weapon there.
But body count and civilian status aside, these two events in 1945 sparked a terrifying arms race spanning over four decades, the consequences of which we are still dealing with today. And for the first time ever, the United States will send an official delegation, led by US Ambassador to Japan John Roos, to the memorial tomorrow.
Though Japan and the US have come a long way in bilateral relations since World War II, there are still some in Japan who feel they are owed, at the very least, an apology by the US government. Says one elderly Japanese woman, quoted in this article:
"Americans think that the bombing was reasonable because it speeded up the end of the war. They try to see it in a positive way," Naomi Sawa, a 69-year-old former teacher, said after paying her respects to the dead. "But we were devastated."Sixty-five years later, and despite the progress our two nations have made, there are still people in Japan who believe that the US was justified in the use of the bomb, and that all American citizens to this day still think President Truman made the right decision.
Of course, that's not a universal truth. And I see a clear parallel between this set of circumstances and that surrounding the current controversy in New York, as plans proceed to build a large mosque and cultural center two blocks from Ground Zero.
One warm September morning nearly a decade ago, our resolve as a nation was tested, and we rallied. Our commander-in-chief swore to "take the fight to the enemy." But he was also rational: President Bush stated, time and again, that "the enemy" was not Islam as a religion, nor the billions of Muslims worldwide who adhere to the faith in all its forms. No, the real enemy of America was the group of twisted militant radicals who had usurped Islam for their selfish, warped cause.
Indeed, for moderate Muslims worldwide and especially for American Muslims, the enemy of America also was and always has been the enemy of Islam.
Yet, nearly a decade later, more and more honest, well-intentioned Americans are forgetting President Bush's pleas: that moderate, accepting, pluralist interpretations of Islam -- as practiced by the millions of Muslims living in the US -- are America's biggest ally in the war on terror. And nowhere is this mindlessness more evident than in the protests over the Cordoba House proposal in New York City.
Never mind that the proposed mosque location is a full two blocks away from the World Trade Center site -- a site which, in this writer's opinion, should be preserved as an eternal, non-denominational memorial to the lives lost on that tragic day in 2001. Never mind that it is not just a mosque, but an interfaith, cultural and community center with a proposed fitness center, swimming pool and performing arts space.
No, the real issue I take with the entire matter is that the group of Muslims and supporters that plans on building this center represents precisely that flavor of Islam that is America's biggest ally: an Islam that is moderate, open, accepting, peaceful, outspoken against terrorism in the name of Islam, and American in the truest sense (see this Time Magazine article here).
And inflammatory personalities like Newt Gingrich and Sarah Palin are only making matters worse. Of course, they have the right to freedom of speech, but liberty should never be equated to license. They're only serving to further stoke the anti-Muslim fire that, unfortunately, is growing and spreading more and more each day.
With all that said, these sorts of reactions are to be expected. After all, it hasn't been a full 10 years yet since 9/11, and we as a nation are still struggling with the demons that haunt us, as well as trying to find a better, more peaceful path forward. It has been 65 years since Hiroshima, and yet many Japanese believe that not only was the US in the wrong, but that all Americans to this day still believe we did the right thing by dropping two nuclear weapons on Japan. That simply is not true. Many in the US, and especially those most intimate with America's secret weapons program in the 1940s, have regretted President Truman's decision -- not only because the destructive power of the nuclear bomb was unleashed upon innocent civilians, but also because of the ensuing arms race it sparked.
We are still struggling with those demons as well. But what Americans need to do, now more than ever, is start thinking for themselves again. Listen to what someone like Sarah Palin says -- and then ask yourself if you would come to the same conclusion anyway. Is it really "against common moral sense," as she says, to build an open, moderate Islamic mosque two blocks from Ground Zero? Would we really be up in arms if a church were being proposed? Or a synagogue? Or, for that matter, a Hindu mandir or Buddhist temple? Most likely not.
Remember now, more than ever, that we are American in our values. We uphold freedom and liberty more than anything else. It is precisely our adherence to and defense of these values that have made us a strong, robust, diverse and resilient nation.
Let us not forget who we are.
7.23.2010
The Real Deal with Cesium
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
-----
The month of July has been a big one for the chemical element Cesium. Produced naturally through the nuclear fuel cycle and used in a variety of applications from agriculture to cancer treatment, it is highly radioactive in isotopic form Cs-137.
The idea has been floated for a long time of using cesium in a radioactive "dirty bomb," which wouldn't have the same explosive power as a uranium or plutonium nuclear bomb but would contaminate land, water supplies and living organisms, including people. In March 2002, Henry Kelly, President of the Federation of American Scientists, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the possibility of constructing dirty bombs using three different radioactive elements -- cesium, cobalt and americium. He demonstrated that if a cesium-137 bomb were exploded using 10 pounds of TNT at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC, the resulting contamination might look something like this:
Where the innermost ring represents one cancer death per 100 people due to remaining radiation, the middle ring represents one cancer death per 1,000 people, and the outer ring represents one cancer death per 10,000 people. Moreover, the EPA would recommend decontamination or destruction of the entire area within the outermost ring.
So since cesium can be stolen from a hospital and thus can be more easily acquired than, say, uranium or plutonium, it wouldn't be a stretch to imagine a terrorist group acquiring enough cesium to construct a barrage of low-explosive, highly radioactive bombs and blanketing a major city with them.
It's a good thing people are paying attention to this terrifying possibility: during the month of July alone, cesium and its relatives have gotten some great coverage, though not in the mainstream media. The Global Security Newswire reported on July 6 that federal and New York state authorities, together with people from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), collaborated on removing a small amount of cesium-137 from St. Vincent's Hospital in Manhattan. Two weeks later, on July 22, the same media outlet reported that a lead-lined safe containing radioactive "seeds" used in cancer treatment had gone missing from a hospital in Illinois.
But here's the scariest incident of attempted or actual cesium theft or disappearance: on July 10, five men were arrested in Pretoria, South Africa, for attempting to sell a cesium device for $6 million dollars to undercover agents posing as potential black-market buyers. Rachel Maddow on MSNBC did a good job of covering the matter in her show on July 19. You can watch the six-minute clip here.
If anyone comes across more incidents of cesium theft or disappearance, anywhere in the world and no matter how spurious the report, please let me know.
-----
The month of July has been a big one for the chemical element Cesium. Produced naturally through the nuclear fuel cycle and used in a variety of applications from agriculture to cancer treatment, it is highly radioactive in isotopic form Cs-137.
The idea has been floated for a long time of using cesium in a radioactive "dirty bomb," which wouldn't have the same explosive power as a uranium or plutonium nuclear bomb but would contaminate land, water supplies and living organisms, including people. In March 2002, Henry Kelly, President of the Federation of American Scientists, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the possibility of constructing dirty bombs using three different radioactive elements -- cesium, cobalt and americium. He demonstrated that if a cesium-137 bomb were exploded using 10 pounds of TNT at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC, the resulting contamination might look something like this:
Where the innermost ring represents one cancer death per 100 people due to remaining radiation, the middle ring represents one cancer death per 1,000 people, and the outer ring represents one cancer death per 10,000 people. Moreover, the EPA would recommend decontamination or destruction of the entire area within the outermost ring.
So since cesium can be stolen from a hospital and thus can be more easily acquired than, say, uranium or plutonium, it wouldn't be a stretch to imagine a terrorist group acquiring enough cesium to construct a barrage of low-explosive, highly radioactive bombs and blanketing a major city with them.
It's a good thing people are paying attention to this terrifying possibility: during the month of July alone, cesium and its relatives have gotten some great coverage, though not in the mainstream media. The Global Security Newswire reported on July 6 that federal and New York state authorities, together with people from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), collaborated on removing a small amount of cesium-137 from St. Vincent's Hospital in Manhattan. Two weeks later, on July 22, the same media outlet reported that a lead-lined safe containing radioactive "seeds" used in cancer treatment had gone missing from a hospital in Illinois.
But here's the scariest incident of attempted or actual cesium theft or disappearance: on July 10, five men were arrested in Pretoria, South Africa, for attempting to sell a cesium device for $6 million dollars to undercover agents posing as potential black-market buyers. Rachel Maddow on MSNBC did a good job of covering the matter in her show on July 19. You can watch the six-minute clip here.
If anyone comes across more incidents of cesium theft or disappearance, anywhere in the world and no matter how spurious the report, please let me know.
7.15.2010
Nuclear Smuggling in the Former Soviet Union
Cross-posted with the Huffington Post.
-----
Part of my research responsibilities this summer at the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard includes working on the Anecdotes of Insecurity project, which is hosted on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website (accessible here, though it is admittedly outdated). And in working on that project today, I came across some news that really has piqued my interest in the swath of land that connects Russia to Iran and Turkey -- namely, the countries of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In 2006, a North Ossetian man named Oleg Khintsagov (sometimes spelled Khinsagov) was arrested for selling 100 grams of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to an undercover Georgian official. He was sentenced to 7 years in prison. An excellent detailed report of the entire episode (in PDF format) is available from the Belfer Center here.
Just last month, it was announced that Khintsagov would receive a presidential pardon that would drop the last two years of his sentence, effectively ending his imprisonment sometime in January or February 2011.
Dr. Matt Bunn, one of the principal investigators at the Project on Managing the Atom where I'm working this summer, was quoted in the Georgian Daily article:
The Caucasus region has become a hotbed of illicit trafficking in all manner of goods, from the everyday and mundane to the highly dangerous. This trend has given the region of South Ossetia (where Khintsagov went to sell his HEU) the nickname of "the world's biggest duty-free shop." Seems to me it has been earned.
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Part of my research responsibilities this summer at the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard includes working on the Anecdotes of Insecurity project, which is hosted on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website (accessible here, though it is admittedly outdated). And in working on that project today, I came across some news that really has piqued my interest in the swath of land that connects Russia to Iran and Turkey -- namely, the countries of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In 2006, a North Ossetian man named Oleg Khintsagov (sometimes spelled Khinsagov) was arrested for selling 100 grams of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to an undercover Georgian official. He was sentenced to 7 years in prison. An excellent detailed report of the entire episode (in PDF format) is available from the Belfer Center here.
Just last month, it was announced that Khintsagov would receive a presidential pardon that would drop the last two years of his sentence, effectively ending his imprisonment sometime in January or February 2011.
Dr. Matt Bunn, one of the principal investigators at the Project on Managing the Atom where I'm working this summer, was quoted in the Georgian Daily article:
Matthew Bunn, a specialist on nuclear theft and terrorism at Harvard University, called Khintsagov’s early release not uncommon, but nonetheless troubling. “One of the key things to stop nuclear smuggling is to try and deter people from getting into nuclear smuggling. … Anything that decreases the consequences is a concern,” Bunn said.Which brings me to a very interesting statistic, offered up in April of this year by Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC. I'm putting this one short sentence into a block quote just to illustrate the alarming danger of the situation:
"The Georgian ministry of interior has foiled eight attempts of illicit trafficking of enriched uranium during the last ten years, including several cases of weapons-grade enrichment."Eight cases during the last ten years is a lot -- especially when speculating about the number of attempts that weren't thwarted. If the prospects of nuclear smuggling and terrorism are to be taken seriously, then government officials must pay closer attention to regions like the Caucasus, where the potential for illicit trafficking of nuclear-related materials is at its highest. Throw in the fact that the region borders Iran (it's not coincidence that so much smuggling comes through Georgia), and the potential for disaster becomes much greater.
The Caucasus region has become a hotbed of illicit trafficking in all manner of goods, from the everyday and mundane to the highly dangerous. This trend has given the region of South Ossetia (where Khintsagov went to sell his HEU) the nickname of "the world's biggest duty-free shop." Seems to me it has been earned.
7.07.2010
Ad hoc Agreements and Nonproliferation
For a while now, I have been looking into the litany of agreements, frameworks, treaties and partnerships that constitute the “global nonproliferation regime.” The cornerstone, of course, is the 1968 NPT. Other formal components include the IAEA and its safeguards, the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in export controls, and the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) across the world. All of these are initiatives that to one degree or another are formal, multilateral, and codified in international law.
But there are less formal, more ad hoc agreements that form a sort of “second layer” on top of the formal-arrangement layer. These initiatives may be strictly bilateral, they may be loose partnerships or coalitions with no formal structure, and/or they may not be codified in international law – which is another way of saying they may not be constrained by international law. Examples of these second-layer efforts include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Bush-legacy Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the number of bilateral agreements the United States has recently been inking with nations around the world. Two very current examples include a US-Malta anti-nuclear smuggling agreement, and a safeguards agreement between the US and Kuwait. Both deals are agreed to and signed on the US side by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous branch of the Department of Energy.
The benefit of such deals, and of ad hoc arrangements in general, is that by not having the structure of a formal international organization with a secretariat, offices, etc., these agreements and partnerships are more fluid and can mobilize much more quickly. For example, if US intelligence picks up a story about a German-registered merchant vessel bound for Iran from North Korea that potentially has uranium enrichment components on board, one of two things could happen: either the United States could request action from a body like the UN Security Council, or it could leverage a partnership like the PSI.
In the first scenario, the UNSC would convene, deliberate, and finally make a decision in the form of a resolution -- or not. Either way, this process would take considerable time, which in the example given is of the utmost importance and cannot be wasted.
In the second scenario, the US might call on a PSI member state that can interdict the merchant vessel while it is en route to Iran. The member state would probably be a country like Japan, Philippines, Oman, or Qatar, and fellow PSI member Germany would give at least its acknowledgment if not its full permission for the US and/or other coordinating states to take action. That merchant vessel could be intercepted and any illicit materials could be seized -- all in a matter of hours. In the meantime, the UN Security Council would still be debating.
(Incidentally, this example is a variation of an actual situation in 2003, when a ship carrying centrifuge equipment and bound for Libya was interdicted. Following talks with US and UK officials, Libya renounced its nuclear ambitions later that year.)
The role and importance of such "second-layer" arrangements -- which fill the gaps that inevitably are created when formal international arrangements are codified and bureaucratized -- will continue to increase as world leaders recommit themselves to serious arms control efforts, with a view to nonproliferation and disarmament. In a post-Cold War, 9/11-influenced asymmetric arena, the threat of nuclear annihilation comes less from official state actors and more from non-state actors, who could acquire the requisite materials, technology and/or expertise to detonate a weapon of some kind and suffer little consequence, owing to their amorphous, undefinable nature in international politics. As such, the international community will need to continue to possess the capability to move quickly and efficiently, at a moment's notice, to increase the security of nuclear weapons stockpiles, facilities and material, all while preventing in real time any attempts to breach that security.
But there are less formal, more ad hoc agreements that form a sort of “second layer” on top of the formal-arrangement layer. These initiatives may be strictly bilateral, they may be loose partnerships or coalitions with no formal structure, and/or they may not be codified in international law – which is another way of saying they may not be constrained by international law. Examples of these second-layer efforts include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Bush-legacy Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the number of bilateral agreements the United States has recently been inking with nations around the world. Two very current examples include a US-Malta anti-nuclear smuggling agreement, and a safeguards agreement between the US and Kuwait. Both deals are agreed to and signed on the US side by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous branch of the Department of Energy.
The benefit of such deals, and of ad hoc arrangements in general, is that by not having the structure of a formal international organization with a secretariat, offices, etc., these agreements and partnerships are more fluid and can mobilize much more quickly. For example, if US intelligence picks up a story about a German-registered merchant vessel bound for Iran from North Korea that potentially has uranium enrichment components on board, one of two things could happen: either the United States could request action from a body like the UN Security Council, or it could leverage a partnership like the PSI.
In the first scenario, the UNSC would convene, deliberate, and finally make a decision in the form of a resolution -- or not. Either way, this process would take considerable time, which in the example given is of the utmost importance and cannot be wasted.
In the second scenario, the US might call on a PSI member state that can interdict the merchant vessel while it is en route to Iran. The member state would probably be a country like Japan, Philippines, Oman, or Qatar, and fellow PSI member Germany would give at least its acknowledgment if not its full permission for the US and/or other coordinating states to take action. That merchant vessel could be intercepted and any illicit materials could be seized -- all in a matter of hours. In the meantime, the UN Security Council would still be debating.
(Incidentally, this example is a variation of an actual situation in 2003, when a ship carrying centrifuge equipment and bound for Libya was interdicted. Following talks with US and UK officials, Libya renounced its nuclear ambitions later that year.)
The role and importance of such "second-layer" arrangements -- which fill the gaps that inevitably are created when formal international arrangements are codified and bureaucratized -- will continue to increase as world leaders recommit themselves to serious arms control efforts, with a view to nonproliferation and disarmament. In a post-Cold War, 9/11-influenced asymmetric arena, the threat of nuclear annihilation comes less from official state actors and more from non-state actors, who could acquire the requisite materials, technology and/or expertise to detonate a weapon of some kind and suffer little consequence, owing to their amorphous, undefinable nature in international politics. As such, the international community will need to continue to possess the capability to move quickly and efficiently, at a moment's notice, to increase the security of nuclear weapons stockpiles, facilities and material, all while preventing in real time any attempts to breach that security.
6.21.2010
Nuclear Musical Chairs
Just until last week, Pakistan and China were forging ahead with a civilian nuclear deal, although now things don't look so sure. India and South Korea, looking to strengthen ties, agreed two weeks ago to start discussing nuclear trade. And now India and Canada have entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement.
What is going on? Why the sudden uptick in bilateral nuclear energy agreements? And how interesting that these talks and agreements are being struck with India and Pakistan. It seems that everyone wants a slice of the action in South Asia.
The watershed decision that sparked this race? Why, the Bush legacy US-India deal, of course. I've talked about this agreement once before. No, twice before. There is no doubt in this writer's mind that the agreement was a bad idea from the very start -- not from a practical, energy needs-addressing standpoint, but from an international legal and precedent perspective. It should never have been done. After all, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules dictate that agreements with any country that is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are not permitted. Yet the US was able to flex some muscle a few years ago and get the NSG to allow an exception to the rules for India.
And just last week, the annual NSG meeting was held in Christchurch, New Zealand, where the China-Pakistan deal was to be discussed one way or another. The NSG members were expecting China to explain its position and answer fundamental questions that would clarify exactly how the deal would take place and be implemented -- especially since nuclear-related trade between an NSG member and a country that is not party to the NPT is prohibited. As it turned out, the Chinese were unable to provide answers to these core questions, and now it appears the deal may not happen at all. But the fact that this item was even on the agenda at all -- and that it has garnered considerable international media attention -- is a testament to the staying power and legacy of the US-India deal, which violated the very same rules that the China-Pakistan deal would have broken. In fact, reports the BBC:
What is going on? Why the sudden uptick in bilateral nuclear energy agreements? And how interesting that these talks and agreements are being struck with India and Pakistan. It seems that everyone wants a slice of the action in South Asia.
The watershed decision that sparked this race? Why, the Bush legacy US-India deal, of course. I've talked about this agreement once before. No, twice before. There is no doubt in this writer's mind that the agreement was a bad idea from the very start -- not from a practical, energy needs-addressing standpoint, but from an international legal and precedent perspective. It should never have been done. After all, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules dictate that agreements with any country that is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are not permitted. Yet the US was able to flex some muscle a few years ago and get the NSG to allow an exception to the rules for India.
And just last week, the annual NSG meeting was held in Christchurch, New Zealand, where the China-Pakistan deal was to be discussed one way or another. The NSG members were expecting China to explain its position and answer fundamental questions that would clarify exactly how the deal would take place and be implemented -- especially since nuclear-related trade between an NSG member and a country that is not party to the NPT is prohibited. As it turned out, the Chinese were unable to provide answers to these core questions, and now it appears the deal may not happen at all. But the fact that this item was even on the agenda at all -- and that it has garnered considerable international media attention -- is a testament to the staying power and legacy of the US-India deal, which violated the very same rules that the China-Pakistan deal would have broken. In fact, reports the BBC:
In 2008 the US pushed through an exemption at the Nuclear Suppliers Group enabling India to buy civil nuclear technology abroad. And going into this meeting China's logic seemed to be that if the US could get a deal for its friend -- India -- then China should be able to do the same for its ally -- Pakistan.Unfortunately for China and Pakistan, that's not how things are turning out. I'm interested to see how talks between the two countries continue to unfold in the coming weeks.
6.10.2010
Waltz with Bashar (al-Assad)
Last Sunday, I flew into Monterey, California to spend one week studying international nuclear safeguards policy at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. I learned a lot in those five days, through a series of very informative lectures and presentations from national lab employees, representatives from the IAEA, and safeguards inspectors. Yeah, I said inspectors. You know those news stories you hear, for example, about Iran refusing to let "inspectors" into the country, or about North Korea kicking out "international inspectors?" Yeah, we got to meet and speak with those folks. Seasoned veterans of the nuclear field who have been there, done that and seen it all.
Aside from these lectures, presentations and guest speakers, another part of our course required us to engage in a simulation exercise, in which we were put into pairs and assumed the roles of the representative countries on the IAEA Board of Governors. In this scenario, the Board was meeting to discuss and vote on a draft resolution, put forth by the United States, condemning Syria's clandestine nuclear weapons program, at least as alleged, and calling for the IAEA Director General to invoke his "special inspections" right to coerce Syria into compliance and transparency.
Background: There are 15 countries on the Board of Governors, one of which serves in a presidential or oversight capacity (which is rotational). That country in the simulation was Malaysia. In addition, according to IAEA rules, any country that is named explicitly in a draft resolution, and against which the Board is considering taking action, is allowed to sit in on Board sessions, though it is not allowed to vote. In the simulation, that country was, of course, Syria.
Turns out my partner and I were assigned to play the role of Syria. Right away we recognized the unique role we could play in negotiations. After all, the initial draft was extremely harsh (from the historically Syrian perspective), as it named specific sites which allegedly were nuclear facility sites tied to the Syrian military nuclear program. So we could try to force a more favorable outcome, which ideally would be the voting down of any resolution on the table. In a less ideal but still favorable second option, we would aim to dilute the language of the resolution so much that the end product would be ambiguous, non-binding and relatively unenforceable. No matter what, we resolved, we would do everything in our power to ensure Syria suffered minimal repercussion.
In order to achieve our goal, we had to leverage our unique position of being almost like a ghost at the Board meeting. We could discuss issues with other Board members, we could voice our opinions in plenary sessions, and we could even make a formal statement prior to the final voting session. But we couldn't vote ourselves. So we had to seek out countries on the Board that might empathize with us -- or that would want to leverage our issues for their own personal gain.
As it so happened, we didn't have to raise a finger. Egypt approached us almost immediately, and we struck a strong relationship. Because Israel unilaterally attacked at least one Syrian site, and because Israel has a nuclear weapons arsenal, Egypt championed our cause and claimed, partially on our behalf and partially on its own, that the real issue at stake wasn't whether Syria had a clandestine nuclear weapons program, or whether the site that was attacked had anything to do with such a program, but rather that Israel made a move which in itself constituted an act of war, and that the real criminal here was Israel, not Syria. If anything, Syria was the victim.
Other countries approached us in similar manners, and lines were quickly drawn and sides were taken. Essentially, it came down to the Non-Aligned Movement (a large group within the United Nations General Assembly that has significant latent negotiating and voting power) versus the United States and its allies.
Interestingly, of the P-5 (US, UK, Russia, China, France), Russia and France sought out the Syrian delegation and put an interesting proposal on table, in which the draft resolution would urge the Director General to conduct a special inspection in Syria without explicitly calling it a "special inspection." In return, Russia and France hoped that by appeasing us, they could work out an agreement by which they would be able to provide Syria with civilian nuclear energy cooperation. Russia also had additional interests in having access to Syrian territory to build natural gas pipelines through the Levant at a later date.
In the end, after three hard and long days of intense negotiations, increasing tension and constant bickering over the placement and choice of individual words, the Board of Governors produced a final resolution that was passed by a vote of 11 to 3, with 1 abstaining. That document was so diluted, so vague and toothless, that we as the Syrian delegation were quite satisfied with our intense lobbying efforts and with the final outcome.
Through the exercise, I learned quite a bit about how difficult it can be to get states to agree on anything. I also stepped into the shoes of the Syrians and took a look at things from their perspective. I must say, I am both impressed and daunted by the enormous complexity of trying to resolve such issues.
On a more real-world note, here's a Washington Times article from last week on what the Board of Governors should do on the Syrian issue. Though the Board meeting has already happened, it's still of note to read the article all the way through. Though I don't agree with everything the author says, it is important to realize that his viewpoint is reflective of many countries' perspectives on this highly complex, politically charged issue.
Aside from these lectures, presentations and guest speakers, another part of our course required us to engage in a simulation exercise, in which we were put into pairs and assumed the roles of the representative countries on the IAEA Board of Governors. In this scenario, the Board was meeting to discuss and vote on a draft resolution, put forth by the United States, condemning Syria's clandestine nuclear weapons program, at least as alleged, and calling for the IAEA Director General to invoke his "special inspections" right to coerce Syria into compliance and transparency.
Background: There are 15 countries on the Board of Governors, one of which serves in a presidential or oversight capacity (which is rotational). That country in the simulation was Malaysia. In addition, according to IAEA rules, any country that is named explicitly in a draft resolution, and against which the Board is considering taking action, is allowed to sit in on Board sessions, though it is not allowed to vote. In the simulation, that country was, of course, Syria.
Turns out my partner and I were assigned to play the role of Syria. Right away we recognized the unique role we could play in negotiations. After all, the initial draft was extremely harsh (from the historically Syrian perspective), as it named specific sites which allegedly were nuclear facility sites tied to the Syrian military nuclear program. So we could try to force a more favorable outcome, which ideally would be the voting down of any resolution on the table. In a less ideal but still favorable second option, we would aim to dilute the language of the resolution so much that the end product would be ambiguous, non-binding and relatively unenforceable. No matter what, we resolved, we would do everything in our power to ensure Syria suffered minimal repercussion.
In order to achieve our goal, we had to leverage our unique position of being almost like a ghost at the Board meeting. We could discuss issues with other Board members, we could voice our opinions in plenary sessions, and we could even make a formal statement prior to the final voting session. But we couldn't vote ourselves. So we had to seek out countries on the Board that might empathize with us -- or that would want to leverage our issues for their own personal gain.
As it so happened, we didn't have to raise a finger. Egypt approached us almost immediately, and we struck a strong relationship. Because Israel unilaterally attacked at least one Syrian site, and because Israel has a nuclear weapons arsenal, Egypt championed our cause and claimed, partially on our behalf and partially on its own, that the real issue at stake wasn't whether Syria had a clandestine nuclear weapons program, or whether the site that was attacked had anything to do with such a program, but rather that Israel made a move which in itself constituted an act of war, and that the real criminal here was Israel, not Syria. If anything, Syria was the victim.
Other countries approached us in similar manners, and lines were quickly drawn and sides were taken. Essentially, it came down to the Non-Aligned Movement (a large group within the United Nations General Assembly that has significant latent negotiating and voting power) versus the United States and its allies.
Interestingly, of the P-5 (US, UK, Russia, China, France), Russia and France sought out the Syrian delegation and put an interesting proposal on table, in which the draft resolution would urge the Director General to conduct a special inspection in Syria without explicitly calling it a "special inspection." In return, Russia and France hoped that by appeasing us, they could work out an agreement by which they would be able to provide Syria with civilian nuclear energy cooperation. Russia also had additional interests in having access to Syrian territory to build natural gas pipelines through the Levant at a later date.
In the end, after three hard and long days of intense negotiations, increasing tension and constant bickering over the placement and choice of individual words, the Board of Governors produced a final resolution that was passed by a vote of 11 to 3, with 1 abstaining. That document was so diluted, so vague and toothless, that we as the Syrian delegation were quite satisfied with our intense lobbying efforts and with the final outcome.
Through the exercise, I learned quite a bit about how difficult it can be to get states to agree on anything. I also stepped into the shoes of the Syrians and took a look at things from their perspective. I must say, I am both impressed and daunted by the enormous complexity of trying to resolve such issues.
On a more real-world note, here's a Washington Times article from last week on what the Board of Governors should do on the Syrian issue. Though the Board meeting has already happened, it's still of note to read the article all the way through. Though I don't agree with everything the author says, it is important to realize that his viewpoint is reflective of many countries' perspectives on this highly complex, politically charged issue.
6.01.2010
The End of a (Half) Decade
In one of the most impressive showings of solidarity in recent history, at least since 1995, the quinquennial Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference concluded last week at UN headquarters in New York with the unanimous approval of a final document outlining ways to strengthen the current nonproliferation regime, while working to bring outliers and NPT defectors (namely, Iran and Israel) back into the fold. Pending release of the final version, a draft is available here.
This last point regarding Israel and Iran requires careful consideration. That the document was approved by all states, including the US, is a testament to the renewed international focus on nuclear weapons and security issues -- propelled, in my opinion, by President Obama more than any one other person. But particularly in the context of a planned followup conference in 2012 to discuss the feasibility and realization of an eventual Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, the explicit naming in the document of Israel as being a nuclear weapons state certainly ruffled some eagle feathers.
"Our view," said President Obama in his remarks at the conclusion of the Review Conference, "is that a comprehensive and durable peace in the region and full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations are essential ... We strongly oppose efforts to single out Israel, and will oppose actions that jeopardize Israel’s national security."
Israel made a similar declaration, calling the statement coming out of the Conference "deeply flawed and hypocritical."
Yet Iran, whose work on its suspect nuclear program continues unabated and which represents in the eyes of the US the greatest threat to a Middle East NWFZ, was not mentioned explicitly anywhere in the final document.
With this in mind, and given both the over- and undertones of US foreign policy in the Middle East, especially vis-à-vis Israel and Iran, it is certainly interesting and impressive that the American delegates to the conference were able, in the eleventh hour, to agree to the statement and pass it unanimously with the other 188 participatory nations at the Conference. Rather than oppose the document or even abstain from the approval process (though I'm not sure if that was an option), the US delegates chose to demonstrate solidarity and pass the document as it stood, with its explicit mention of Israel and lack of even passing reference to Iran.
This was a very smart move on the part of the Obama administration. From a long-term policy perspective, the Review Conference was never an end in itself. Over a month in advance of the conference, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Susan Burk called it "a critical milestone in the broader international effort to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime."
So with the final hours winding down, and with Egypt and the US going back and forth over mention of Israel, the Americans capitulated. Better to demonstrate unanimity and solidarity with the international community at the conference, and let the President and his Israeli equivalent take care of damage control afterwards.
Considering this is only the third time in Review Conference history that all member states have emerged with a consensus statement, this year was highly significant.
We're looking forward to 2015 already.
This last point regarding Israel and Iran requires careful consideration. That the document was approved by all states, including the US, is a testament to the renewed international focus on nuclear weapons and security issues -- propelled, in my opinion, by President Obama more than any one other person. But particularly in the context of a planned followup conference in 2012 to discuss the feasibility and realization of an eventual Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, the explicit naming in the document of Israel as being a nuclear weapons state certainly ruffled some eagle feathers.
"Our view," said President Obama in his remarks at the conclusion of the Review Conference, "is that a comprehensive and durable peace in the region and full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations are essential ... We strongly oppose efforts to single out Israel, and will oppose actions that jeopardize Israel’s national security."
Israel made a similar declaration, calling the statement coming out of the Conference "deeply flawed and hypocritical."
Yet Iran, whose work on its suspect nuclear program continues unabated and which represents in the eyes of the US the greatest threat to a Middle East NWFZ, was not mentioned explicitly anywhere in the final document.
With this in mind, and given both the over- and undertones of US foreign policy in the Middle East, especially vis-à-vis Israel and Iran, it is certainly interesting and impressive that the American delegates to the conference were able, in the eleventh hour, to agree to the statement and pass it unanimously with the other 188 participatory nations at the Conference. Rather than oppose the document or even abstain from the approval process (though I'm not sure if that was an option), the US delegates chose to demonstrate solidarity and pass the document as it stood, with its explicit mention of Israel and lack of even passing reference to Iran.
This was a very smart move on the part of the Obama administration. From a long-term policy perspective, the Review Conference was never an end in itself. Over a month in advance of the conference, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Susan Burk called it "a critical milestone in the broader international effort to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime."
So with the final hours winding down, and with Egypt and the US going back and forth over mention of Israel, the Americans capitulated. Better to demonstrate unanimity and solidarity with the international community at the conference, and let the President and his Israeli equivalent take care of damage control afterwards.
Considering this is only the third time in Review Conference history that all member states have emerged with a consensus statement, this year was highly significant.
We're looking forward to 2015 already.
5.03.2010
How I got into nuclear security issues and came to Fletcher
A common question Fletcher students like to ask each other is, "What are you studying here in grad school?" But the followup question, and the one which always intrigues us more, is, "What was your path that led you here?"
When I'm asked this question, I usually launch into a 10-minute monologue on how my mom is from Pakistan and my dad is from India, and how some random kid's comment when I was in high school on the perceived polarity of their marriage opened my eyes to Indo-Pakistani issues, and how both countries have nuclear weapons, and how further tensions between them could increase the temptation to use those nuclear weapons, and how we would all be in a heap of trouble if that breakout doomsday scenario ever were to occur.
All of this is true, and they certainly do form an integral part of my story, of my path, that has led me to study nuclear security issues at Fletcher.
But everyone has a tipping point -- the proverbial "last straw" that just ... does it for them. For some it's a slow but eventual realization of things. For others it's a snap moment, or some kind of event that turns their world upside down and/or puts things into crystal-clear perspective. I belong to the latter group.
My last straw? The Bombay attacks of 26 November, 2008. I'll never forget it: I was at work (I used to work in private sector IT consulting in those days) and saw it on CNN in our office lobby.
That moment turned my world upside down -- and opened my eyes to the larger picture: five recognized nuclear weapons states, three to four non-recognized nuclear weapons states, and a slew of countries that have or are developing nuclear energy capabilities and may want to go military one day.
That's when I knew that if I wanted to one day bring my own children into this world and provide an environment for them that was relatively safe and free from the constant threat of annihilation and fire raining down from the heavens, I needed to get into this field of study. I needed to understand why we still have these weapons, even two decades after the end of the Cold War, and what complexities keep them so firmly in the defense strategies and minds of numerous countries.
So I applied and was accepted to Fletcher.
Just today, the only surviving attacker from the Bombay attacks was convicted by an Indian court and sentenced to either life in prison or the death penalty (final sentence forthcoming).
I'd like to think that this would generate some sort of collective sigh of relief on both sides of the India-Pakistan divide, and perhaps it might (though most likely it won't). But what this news means for me is that the real fight -- not over Kashmir, not over the Hindu-Muslim schism, not over cultural or political issues on the subcontinent -- is a long way from being over. Nuclear weapons are still there. The option to one day use them is still on the table, now matter how politically unfathomable it might be.
One day, I'd like to go back to Bombay and trace the entire event. Just to remind myself of that moment in November 2008 when I suddenly and completely knew what I wanted to do.
When I'm asked this question, I usually launch into a 10-minute monologue on how my mom is from Pakistan and my dad is from India, and how some random kid's comment when I was in high school on the perceived polarity of their marriage opened my eyes to Indo-Pakistani issues, and how both countries have nuclear weapons, and how further tensions between them could increase the temptation to use those nuclear weapons, and how we would all be in a heap of trouble if that breakout doomsday scenario ever were to occur.
All of this is true, and they certainly do form an integral part of my story, of my path, that has led me to study nuclear security issues at Fletcher.
But everyone has a tipping point -- the proverbial "last straw" that just ... does it for them. For some it's a slow but eventual realization of things. For others it's a snap moment, or some kind of event that turns their world upside down and/or puts things into crystal-clear perspective. I belong to the latter group.
My last straw? The Bombay attacks of 26 November, 2008. I'll never forget it: I was at work (I used to work in private sector IT consulting in those days) and saw it on CNN in our office lobby.
That moment turned my world upside down -- and opened my eyes to the larger picture: five recognized nuclear weapons states, three to four non-recognized nuclear weapons states, and a slew of countries that have or are developing nuclear energy capabilities and may want to go military one day.
That's when I knew that if I wanted to one day bring my own children into this world and provide an environment for them that was relatively safe and free from the constant threat of annihilation and fire raining down from the heavens, I needed to get into this field of study. I needed to understand why we still have these weapons, even two decades after the end of the Cold War, and what complexities keep them so firmly in the defense strategies and minds of numerous countries.
So I applied and was accepted to Fletcher.
Just today, the only surviving attacker from the Bombay attacks was convicted by an Indian court and sentenced to either life in prison or the death penalty (final sentence forthcoming).
I'd like to think that this would generate some sort of collective sigh of relief on both sides of the India-Pakistan divide, and perhaps it might (though most likely it won't). But what this news means for me is that the real fight -- not over Kashmir, not over the Hindu-Muslim schism, not over cultural or political issues on the subcontinent -- is a long way from being over. Nuclear weapons are still there. The option to one day use them is still on the table, now matter how politically unfathomable it might be.
One day, I'd like to go back to Bombay and trace the entire event. Just to remind myself of that moment in November 2008 when I suddenly and completely knew what I wanted to do.
4.22.2010
"We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state"
Reiterating its steadfast position regarding North Korea, its nuclear program and normalization of relations with Kim Jong-Il's regime, the US yesterday affirmed that it will not accede to demands from the DPRK that it be recognized globally as a nuclear-weapon state.
North Korea says it will recommit to the NPT and start working again on arms control measures towards disarmament -- as soon as the world accords it the status it feels it deserves.
So the simple answer would be to say, "OK, Kim, you're a nuclear weapons state. There you go. Now let's take those nukes off your hands." Right?
Wrong. Here are a few reasons why it isn't that simple:
North Korea says it will recommit to the NPT and start working again on arms control measures towards disarmament -- as soon as the world accords it the status it feels it deserves.
So the simple answer would be to say, "OK, Kim, you're a nuclear weapons state. There you go. Now let's take those nukes off your hands." Right?
Wrong. Here are a few reasons why it isn't that simple:
- TRUST -- To put it bluntly, the world can't trust the DPRK. In the context of the Six-Party Talks, the North Korean negotiators have become very adept at dancing a delicate yet highly effective dance, in which they start trending towards the "positive" (for example, agreeing to allow inspectors back into Yongbyon), and then suddenly reverse momentum and go "negative" (for example, conducting an underground nuclear test). The DPRK is like a pendulum, except there is no way of telling when they will swing back the other way. You never know what to expect, so believing the North is hard.
- COMPLICATIONS -- The problem isn't that simple. There are lots of other factors to keep in mind, including but not limited to DPRK-ROK relations, economic aid and the lifting of trade barriers, and humanitarian relief. Recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state doesn't automatically mean that Russia, China, South Korea and Japan will automatically come to consensus on all these other issues. Which brings us to point 3:
- PERSPECTIVE -- To the DPRK, being granted a certain recognized status is a legitimate desire. Through the North Korean lens, having military nuclear capabilities means you get taken seriously on the world stage, and it isn't difficult to see why that is the sentiment there. The world's five recognized nuclear powers (US, UK, France, China, Russia) belong in the top 12 list of largest economies (by nominal GDP), and even India (#11), Israel (#40) and Pakistan (#45) are significantly more robust economically than North Korea (#88). So from North Korea's perspective, perhaps having nukes means more trade, more aid, and more credibility.
This of course doesn't work for the other countries involved in the Six-Party talks, especially the US and its strongest allies, the ROK and Japan. They see a clear security concern, and the US has had to make numerous assurances regarding its defense of its allies through its extended "nuclear umbrella." Japan and the ROK, for their part, are concerned about the nuclear presence in North Korea, though for very different reasons.
In short, every country (and I haven't even touched on China or Russia here) has a different perspective on giving North Korea what it demands.
4.15.2010
India, Pakistan, Nukes and US Policy
Last week, this writer had the immense privilege of presenting at the annual Project on Nuclear Issues Conference in DC, organized by CSIS. My presentation there was on US leadership in addressing nuclear proliferation challenges in South Asia.
Of course, the US should care about Indo-Pakistani relations. Not only is India a robust and quickly-growing world economy that engages in large-scale daily trade with the US, and not only do we need the help of Pakistan in our ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, but we have additional strategic concerns in the region with regard to the growing power of China, concerning humanitarian and aid relief efforts, and as a part of our overall diplomatic overtures to the Islamic world.
But the US -- and indeed the international community -- has even more reason to cool tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi, owing to the nuclear presence in both countries' defense strategies.
Regardless of why India and Pakistan have pursued acquisition of the bomb, the fact is that both have it and, from each country's perspective, have plenty of reason to use it against the other. But this is exactly what must not happen. In a recent article, I referenced the effects a hypothetical limited regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan would have on the subcontinent and indeed on the world. The scientists who carried out this study had worked with Carl Sagan in the 1980s on the idea of nuclear winter, and the conclusions they drew from their analysis is absolutely chilling.
Both India and Pakistan (though not the only ones) are not party to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and there are certain measures the US can take -- some symbolic, some actionable -- to lead by example and encourage both nations to understand better their priorities and interests in the context of changing circumstances and new global challenges.
One thing the US can do is keep the momentum of this week's Nuclear Security Summit going by hosting roundtable talks with India and Pakistan -- and perhaps even with other invested countries. Though it wasn't substantial, it certainly does count for something that at the Summit, Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousuf Raza Gilani shook hands. PM Gilani later reported that PM Singh had accepted his invitation to visit Islamabad in the near future.
In the meantime, however, peace talks between the two countries -- which have been protracted over long-standing issues like Kashmir -- have completely stalled in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. The Indian government wants Pakistan to take a harder line against terrorist cells like Lashkar-e-Taiba, responsible for the 26/11 attacks and widely believed to be receiving clandestine support and funding from the ISI, Pakistan's equivalent of the American CIA. Pakistan, for its part, officially denounces such claims and says that it too faces the same types of terrorist threats, and so asserts that the two countries should be working closely together on addressing mutual security concerns. The US, having a sustained interest in the region and relatively good ties with both countries, should mediate roundtable talks to address those mutual concerns.
Another thing the US can do is to continue bilateral work separately with each country to advance President Obama's goal of securing all loose fissile material worldwide within four years. Such measures would include stopping the production of all fissile material (a particular challenge for Pakistan), which may include a formal fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). In addition, the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation deal, agreed in 2005 and then signed and ratified in 2007-2008, should not become a template to be applied to other states -- especially Pakistan, who called just two weeks ago for precisely that.
Finally, the US Senate should ratify the CTBT as more of a symbolic gesture. At the very least, it wouldn't hurt.
There are additional measures the US can take, but those are more in the category of sweeping regime reform, which can be the topic of another article sometime soon.
The bottom line: if the US wants to maintain and strengthen nuclear security, and protect not only its borders but those of its allies and partners worldwide, it needs to bring India and Pakistan into the fold by leading the way.
Of course, the US should care about Indo-Pakistani relations. Not only is India a robust and quickly-growing world economy that engages in large-scale daily trade with the US, and not only do we need the help of Pakistan in our ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, but we have additional strategic concerns in the region with regard to the growing power of China, concerning humanitarian and aid relief efforts, and as a part of our overall diplomatic overtures to the Islamic world.
But the US -- and indeed the international community -- has even more reason to cool tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi, owing to the nuclear presence in both countries' defense strategies.
Regardless of why India and Pakistan have pursued acquisition of the bomb, the fact is that both have it and, from each country's perspective, have plenty of reason to use it against the other. But this is exactly what must not happen. In a recent article, I referenced the effects a hypothetical limited regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan would have on the subcontinent and indeed on the world. The scientists who carried out this study had worked with Carl Sagan in the 1980s on the idea of nuclear winter, and the conclusions they drew from their analysis is absolutely chilling.
Both India and Pakistan (though not the only ones) are not party to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and there are certain measures the US can take -- some symbolic, some actionable -- to lead by example and encourage both nations to understand better their priorities and interests in the context of changing circumstances and new global challenges.
One thing the US can do is keep the momentum of this week's Nuclear Security Summit going by hosting roundtable talks with India and Pakistan -- and perhaps even with other invested countries. Though it wasn't substantial, it certainly does count for something that at the Summit, Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousuf Raza Gilani shook hands. PM Gilani later reported that PM Singh had accepted his invitation to visit Islamabad in the near future.
In the meantime, however, peace talks between the two countries -- which have been protracted over long-standing issues like Kashmir -- have completely stalled in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. The Indian government wants Pakistan to take a harder line against terrorist cells like Lashkar-e-Taiba, responsible for the 26/11 attacks and widely believed to be receiving clandestine support and funding from the ISI, Pakistan's equivalent of the American CIA. Pakistan, for its part, officially denounces such claims and says that it too faces the same types of terrorist threats, and so asserts that the two countries should be working closely together on addressing mutual security concerns. The US, having a sustained interest in the region and relatively good ties with both countries, should mediate roundtable talks to address those mutual concerns.
Another thing the US can do is to continue bilateral work separately with each country to advance President Obama's goal of securing all loose fissile material worldwide within four years. Such measures would include stopping the production of all fissile material (a particular challenge for Pakistan), which may include a formal fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). In addition, the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation deal, agreed in 2005 and then signed and ratified in 2007-2008, should not become a template to be applied to other states -- especially Pakistan, who called just two weeks ago for precisely that.
Finally, the US Senate should ratify the CTBT as more of a symbolic gesture. At the very least, it wouldn't hurt.
There are additional measures the US can take, but those are more in the category of sweeping regime reform, which can be the topic of another article sometime soon.
The bottom line: if the US wants to maintain and strengthen nuclear security, and protect not only its borders but those of its allies and partners worldwide, it needs to bring India and Pakistan into the fold by leading the way.
4.05.2010
Looking Ahead to the Nuclear Security Summit
In exactly one week, President Obama is scheduled to host his highly-publicized and much-anticipated Nuclear Security Summit, which will bring together nearly fifty heads of state to discuss a forward-looking plan to strengthen the security of existing nuclear weapons, material and technology worldwide.
At the same time, this summit must fit into Obama's nuclear strategy agenda, which he outlined very neatly in his Prague speech exactly one year ago today. The strengthening of the current non-proliferation regime is high on that list, as are Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a follow-up agreement to replace START I. Happily, the latter has been achieved, and additional pressure will be put on the Senate to ratify the CTBT in the months leading up to mid-term congressional elections later this year.
So here are a few points which this writer, who had the very great honor to meet and speak with President Obama last week, would stress to the administration as the President and his staff prepare for this historic summit:
To the President: Best of luck next week.
At the same time, this summit must fit into Obama's nuclear strategy agenda, which he outlined very neatly in his Prague speech exactly one year ago today. The strengthening of the current non-proliferation regime is high on that list, as are Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a follow-up agreement to replace START I. Happily, the latter has been achieved, and additional pressure will be put on the Senate to ratify the CTBT in the months leading up to mid-term congressional elections later this year.
So here are a few points which this writer, who had the very great honor to meet and speak with President Obama last week, would stress to the administration as the President and his staff prepare for this historic summit:
- Curbing the production and spread of fissile material -- Discuss openly the possibility of a universal and legally binding fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) that would help stymie the spread of the plutonium and uranium needed to construct nuclear or even dirty bombs.
- Don't let the India-US deal become a model -- Though the topic of the summit is nuclear security, that realm inevitably will provoke discussion on the global balance that must be struck between military nuclear capability and civilian nuclear power. The 2005 Indo-US nuclear cooperation deal was, from the beginning, a bad idea that must not become the precedent or standard in nuclear-related cooperation agreements.
- Arrange follow-up roundtable talks -- In the case of India and Pakistan, in particular, do not let this summit be the end of nuclear security discussions. Many conversations will need to be taken "off line," or to the side, and those discussions must be promoted and nurtured in similar multilateral arenas. Arrange to conduct additional talks with India and Pakistan together, along with related key players, to examine how the security of nuclear materials can best be enhanced, while curbing the transfer of illicit technology and expertise. Similar models can be set up for North Korea and Iran (though for the former, do not recreate a six-party-talk environment, as that initiative has met with severe roadblocks).
To the President: Best of luck next week.
3.30.2010
The Fallacy of the Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Deal
In 2005, India and the US reached a landmark agreement in which the United States would provide burgeoning India with civilian nuclear power technical assistance and expertise. In return, India would place its civilian nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In 2007, that deal was crystallized, and its text was released to the public. Then at the end of 2008, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed the agreement, which then entered into force.
Now, in the way of implementing that deal, New Delhi and Washington announced yesterday that they have reached an agreement that would allow India to reprocess used nuclear material.
Here's the problem with the above statement: these reprocessing activities would yield plutonium, which can then be used to build nuclear weapons. One of the main points of the bilateral Indo-US deal was to curb proliferation on the South Asian subcontinent, so this most recent development seems counter-intuitive and regressive. And using civilian nuclear capabilities for military purposes wouldn't be a first-time venture for New Delhi. After all, India did the exact same thing over 30 years ago when it used civilian nuclear material to build its first bombs.
Remember that, in order for the 2005 deal to be pushed through with a country that is not a signatory to the NPT, significant exceptions had to be made. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a nuclear export-control organization formed in the 1970s partially in response to India's testing of a nuclear weapon, granted key exemptions to India to allow it to conduct bilateral nuclear trade with the US. Read the press statement from the US-India Business Council on the NSG decision here.
As India has signed bilateral deals now with the US, with France and with Russia, it is absolutely critical that such activities as reprocessing should be checked, not encouraged. Here's a good quote from Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists:
A reprocessing deal is not a step forward -- it's two steps backward.
In 2007, that deal was crystallized, and its text was released to the public. Then at the end of 2008, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed the agreement, which then entered into force.
Now, in the way of implementing that deal, New Delhi and Washington announced yesterday that they have reached an agreement that would allow India to reprocess used nuclear material.
Here's the problem with the above statement: these reprocessing activities would yield plutonium, which can then be used to build nuclear weapons. One of the main points of the bilateral Indo-US deal was to curb proliferation on the South Asian subcontinent, so this most recent development seems counter-intuitive and regressive. And using civilian nuclear capabilities for military purposes wouldn't be a first-time venture for New Delhi. After all, India did the exact same thing over 30 years ago when it used civilian nuclear material to build its first bombs.
Remember that, in order for the 2005 deal to be pushed through with a country that is not a signatory to the NPT, significant exceptions had to be made. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a nuclear export-control organization formed in the 1970s partially in response to India's testing of a nuclear weapon, granted key exemptions to India to allow it to conduct bilateral nuclear trade with the US. Read the press statement from the US-India Business Council on the NSG decision here.
As India has signed bilateral deals now with the US, with France and with Russia, it is absolutely critical that such activities as reprocessing should be checked, not encouraged. Here's a good quote from Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists:
"At a time when nuclear terrorism and proliferation concerns are only increasing, the United States should be doing everything it can to stop existing reprocessing, not facilitate more."India has, by its own account, joined "the club." It is virtually "in" with the recognized nuclear powers. The Bush-Singh deal in 2005 was, in this writer's opinion, a flawed, myopic and disastrous agreement. But now that it has been put in place, further agreements like this reprocessing deal will only serve to highlight the inefficacy of the current non-proliferation regime. At a time when India and Pakistan (both nuclear-armed) are still deadlocked over peace talks and continue to operate outside the 1968 NPT, it is crucial that positive and encouraging steps be taken to curb proliferation in measurable and verifiable ways.
A reprocessing deal is not a step forward -- it's two steps backward.
3.26.2010
Is the New START Treaty Enough?
Edit, March 27, 2009, 8:12 pm: Thanks to the good folks over at Demagogues and Dictators, the following article is published on that site as well. Check it out here.
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After many arduous months of tough negotiations between the US and Russian teams, Presidents Obama and Medvedev have finally agreed to a new follow-on treaty to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), which formally expired in December 2009. The fact sheet is available here. And, noting this is very a propos, exactly one year and three days after Obama's 2009 speech in Prague, Obama and Medvedev will meet in that same city to formally sign the "New START Treaty".
This is all well and good, and given the delicate interests of both parties and the tenacity of the negotiating teams, the results are satisfactory. But are the agreed-upon cuts really substantial enough? Let's take a look at the numbers:
Second, and more importantly, let's look at that first big number: 1,550 warheads each. EACH. Sure, it's a good start, and certainly a significant cut from 1991 levels. But in this writer's humble opinion, over 3,000 nuclear weapons between the US and Russia is still way too many. Here's why:
In December 2006, scientists who worked with Carl Sagan in the 1980s on the "nuclear winter" theory took a hypothetical (though realistic) scenario in which India and Pakistan, engaged in a limited regional nuclear war, detonated a total of 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons on the South Asian subcontinent.
The results of their analysis showed that while immediate fatalities would hover around the 20 million mark, the radiation, soot and debris resulting from the nuclear exchange would create a global cooling effect, affect rainfall levels, destroy agricultural crops and yield at least one billion deaths worldwide from starvation alone. A good synopsis of this study, with links to more detailed information, can be found here.
These are the results from just 100 nuclear weapons being exploded, each at Hiroshima-size levels. The US and Russia are now agreeing to a combined number of warheads that is more than 30 times that (and don't forget that both countries' strategic warheads have destructive powers 10 to 30 times that of Hiroshima's "Little Boy"). If even one nuclear warhead was used on a city in Russia or the US, the resulting nuclear exchange (justified under the basic sovereign right to self-defense) would be unfathomably devastating.
If you ask me, these cuts aren't good enough. Moreover, as Julian Borger at the Guardian says, "the real question now is whether both sides have the stamina to carry on cutting arsenals." The NPT Review Conference is coming up in May, and this writer is privileged to be a delegate to the event. Undoubtedly, the international community, particularly non-nuclear weapons states and activist groups, will be looking to Russia and the US to continue the momentum and make additional deep cuts as they pave the road towards Global Zero.
The White House is calling this the "New START Treaty." If you ask me, that just isn't encouraging enough.
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After many arduous months of tough negotiations between the US and Russian teams, Presidents Obama and Medvedev have finally agreed to a new follow-on treaty to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), which formally expired in December 2009. The fact sheet is available here. And, noting this is very a propos, exactly one year and three days after Obama's 2009 speech in Prague, Obama and Medvedev will meet in that same city to formally sign the "New START Treaty".
This is all well and good, and given the delicate interests of both parties and the tenacity of the negotiating teams, the results are satisfactory. But are the agreed-upon cuts really substantial enough? Let's take a look at the numbers:
- 1,550 warheads, including those on deployed ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). This is a 74% reduction from 1991 levels.
- A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
- A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
Second, and more importantly, let's look at that first big number: 1,550 warheads each. EACH. Sure, it's a good start, and certainly a significant cut from 1991 levels. But in this writer's humble opinion, over 3,000 nuclear weapons between the US and Russia is still way too many. Here's why:
In December 2006, scientists who worked with Carl Sagan in the 1980s on the "nuclear winter" theory took a hypothetical (though realistic) scenario in which India and Pakistan, engaged in a limited regional nuclear war, detonated a total of 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons on the South Asian subcontinent.
The results of their analysis showed that while immediate fatalities would hover around the 20 million mark, the radiation, soot and debris resulting from the nuclear exchange would create a global cooling effect, affect rainfall levels, destroy agricultural crops and yield at least one billion deaths worldwide from starvation alone. A good synopsis of this study, with links to more detailed information, can be found here.
These are the results from just 100 nuclear weapons being exploded, each at Hiroshima-size levels. The US and Russia are now agreeing to a combined number of warheads that is more than 30 times that (and don't forget that both countries' strategic warheads have destructive powers 10 to 30 times that of Hiroshima's "Little Boy"). If even one nuclear warhead was used on a city in Russia or the US, the resulting nuclear exchange (justified under the basic sovereign right to self-defense) would be unfathomably devastating.
If you ask me, these cuts aren't good enough. Moreover, as Julian Borger at the Guardian says, "the real question now is whether both sides have the stamina to carry on cutting arsenals." The NPT Review Conference is coming up in May, and this writer is privileged to be a delegate to the event. Undoubtedly, the international community, particularly non-nuclear weapons states and activist groups, will be looking to Russia and the US to continue the momentum and make additional deep cuts as they pave the road towards Global Zero.
The White House is calling this the "New START Treaty." If you ask me, that just isn't encouraging enough.
3.15.2010
Agnis, Prithvis and Suryas, Oh My!
Yesterday's Global Security Newswire featured two worrying related stories that have me thinking about nuclear security on the South Asian subcontinent.
In the first, India test-launched a short-range ballistic missile called the Prithvi-2, and although the test itself failed, it was indicative of India's continuing efforts to create a missile defense shield against perceived threats from neighboring Pakistan and China, both of whom have collaborated with each other in the past (this is mentioned briefly by Jeffrey Lewis on his blog today at ArmsControlWonk.com, which in turn is in reference to today's Washington Post article on AQ Khan).
In the second article, India's Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) is continuing efforts to develop a long-range cruise missile, the Agni-5, and the government plans to test that early next year. Meaning India, undeterred by the failed Prithvi test, will still continue developing its short-, medium- and long-range capabilities against perceived and potential threats, both near and far. They're even working on a proper ICBM, the Surya, to add intercontinental capability to their arsenal.
I fear for the subcontinent, really I do. It is true that despite their bitter 63-year relationship, India and Pakistan have had the occasional breakthrough. Yet in the past year since the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, any positive relations have been overshadowed by renewed mistrust, obscure intelligence reports, questionable military moves and dubious intents. It certainly doesn't help that AQ Khan has been up to no good in Pakistan. Despite his constant complaining on how much his movements are restricted by his nation's government, and regardless of how much he tries to push blame for his actions onto others, he still was pardoned by Musharraf in 2004, and he was finally released from house arrest last year. His presence, writing and actions are doing nothing to mitigate Indo-Pak tensions.
India's continuing investment into missile defense R&D is understandable, from New Delhi's perspective. But building up a missile defense shield is only going to strain Indo-Pak relations further.
In the first, India test-launched a short-range ballistic missile called the Prithvi-2, and although the test itself failed, it was indicative of India's continuing efforts to create a missile defense shield against perceived threats from neighboring Pakistan and China, both of whom have collaborated with each other in the past (this is mentioned briefly by Jeffrey Lewis on his blog today at ArmsControlWonk.com, which in turn is in reference to today's Washington Post article on AQ Khan).
In the second article, India's Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) is continuing efforts to develop a long-range cruise missile, the Agni-5, and the government plans to test that early next year. Meaning India, undeterred by the failed Prithvi test, will still continue developing its short-, medium- and long-range capabilities against perceived and potential threats, both near and far. They're even working on a proper ICBM, the Surya, to add intercontinental capability to their arsenal.
I fear for the subcontinent, really I do. It is true that despite their bitter 63-year relationship, India and Pakistan have had the occasional breakthrough. Yet in the past year since the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, any positive relations have been overshadowed by renewed mistrust, obscure intelligence reports, questionable military moves and dubious intents. It certainly doesn't help that AQ Khan has been up to no good in Pakistan. Despite his constant complaining on how much his movements are restricted by his nation's government, and regardless of how much he tries to push blame for his actions onto others, he still was pardoned by Musharraf in 2004, and he was finally released from house arrest last year. His presence, writing and actions are doing nothing to mitigate Indo-Pak tensions.
India's continuing investment into missile defense R&D is understandable, from New Delhi's perspective. But building up a missile defense shield is only going to strain Indo-Pak relations further.
3.10.2010
Enlarging the North Korean Pie
Happy Hump Day! It has been a while since my last post, and I'm thinking today of North Korea.
I've been doing a lot of research into mutual US-North Korean concerns in the context of Six-Party Talks. Last week, I had an opportunity to participate in an enlightening simulation, facilitated by Nicole Finneman of the Korea Economic Institute, and although I was given the role of South Korea in the talks, and despite the fact that the actual briefings and negotiations limited the number of issues for all six parties to debate to just three points of contention, I learned so much from that exercise.
Here are my thoughts, broadly speaking: the fundamental concern for the US is North Korea's nuclear weapons program. We see it as a threat to the stability of the region. We have vital strategic interests that we seek to protect. Moreover, by developing its weapons program North Korea is in defiance of international law (think 1968 NPT and numerous UN Security Council resolutions, particularly UNSCR 1874). So the United States, as a permanent member on the Security Council and as the steward of the global nonproliferation regime, has a legal and moral obligation to work with other nations to incite, coerce, pressure and even force the DPRK to give up its weapons.
North Korea's primary concern, however, isn't its nukes program. In fact, those nuclear weapons are actually its only bargaining chip -- and what a hell of a chip, at that. From the North's perspective, the fact that it has a nuclear weapons program is the only thing that has the United States at the table at all. And when you think about it, that's a very accurate perception.
No, the DPRK issue is also the stability of the region. After being locked in a dispute for over 50 years with South Korea over the 38th Parallel border (that war, legally, is still ongoing), and with a desire to join the fold of the international community -- to "come in from the cold," so to speak -- the DPRK sees its nukes as the only leverage it has to get from other nations the things it really needs: food, economic aid, energy assistance. North Korea has a bitter history with Japan, doesn't trust its southern brethren (missiles aimed right at Seoul), and feels pressure from the United States to disarm. Combined with the constant threat of internal collapse, my feeling is that North Korea's already acute fear of isolation from the international community has only become further exacerbated in the wake of heightened tensions over an upcoming joint US-South Korea military exercise. So it's important, above all else, that North Korea find security and stability on the Peninsula.
Interesting, huh? We (the US and North Korea) actually have common concerns and mutual interests, which should incite us to come together to explore how we can "enlarge the pie," rather than simply decide how to divide a pie of fixed size. One challenge is that while the DPRK has been calling for bilateral US-North Korea talks for a long time, the US has steadfastly refused to negotiate on the side, insisting that any and all talks be done at the hexagonal table. There are other complications as well, of course.
So look for further thoughts on North Korea in the near future, as I explore exactly why the two countries aren't leveraging mutual interests to advance a shared agenda, and how this obstacle can be overcome.
I've been doing a lot of research into mutual US-North Korean concerns in the context of Six-Party Talks. Last week, I had an opportunity to participate in an enlightening simulation, facilitated by Nicole Finneman of the Korea Economic Institute, and although I was given the role of South Korea in the talks, and despite the fact that the actual briefings and negotiations limited the number of issues for all six parties to debate to just three points of contention, I learned so much from that exercise.
Here are my thoughts, broadly speaking: the fundamental concern for the US is North Korea's nuclear weapons program. We see it as a threat to the stability of the region. We have vital strategic interests that we seek to protect. Moreover, by developing its weapons program North Korea is in defiance of international law (think 1968 NPT and numerous UN Security Council resolutions, particularly UNSCR 1874). So the United States, as a permanent member on the Security Council and as the steward of the global nonproliferation regime, has a legal and moral obligation to work with other nations to incite, coerce, pressure and even force the DPRK to give up its weapons.
North Korea's primary concern, however, isn't its nukes program. In fact, those nuclear weapons are actually its only bargaining chip -- and what a hell of a chip, at that. From the North's perspective, the fact that it has a nuclear weapons program is the only thing that has the United States at the table at all. And when you think about it, that's a very accurate perception.
No, the DPRK issue is also the stability of the region. After being locked in a dispute for over 50 years with South Korea over the 38th Parallel border (that war, legally, is still ongoing), and with a desire to join the fold of the international community -- to "come in from the cold," so to speak -- the DPRK sees its nukes as the only leverage it has to get from other nations the things it really needs: food, economic aid, energy assistance. North Korea has a bitter history with Japan, doesn't trust its southern brethren (missiles aimed right at Seoul), and feels pressure from the United States to disarm. Combined with the constant threat of internal collapse, my feeling is that North Korea's already acute fear of isolation from the international community has only become further exacerbated in the wake of heightened tensions over an upcoming joint US-South Korea military exercise. So it's important, above all else, that North Korea find security and stability on the Peninsula.
Interesting, huh? We (the US and North Korea) actually have common concerns and mutual interests, which should incite us to come together to explore how we can "enlarge the pie," rather than simply decide how to divide a pie of fixed size. One challenge is that while the DPRK has been calling for bilateral US-North Korea talks for a long time, the US has steadfastly refused to negotiate on the side, insisting that any and all talks be done at the hexagonal table. There are other complications as well, of course.
So look for further thoughts on North Korea in the near future, as I explore exactly why the two countries aren't leveraging mutual interests to advance a shared agenda, and how this obstacle can be overcome.
2.28.2010
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Effective? Sufficient?
By now, you're probably well aware of the thematic focus of this blog. Almost everything I have ever discussed on this site is grounded in a solid understanding of the legalities and principles of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which you can access here. Let's talk about whether this document, which is due for a review later this year, is really sufficient going forward as President Obama advances his nonproliferation and disarmament agendas.
Article VI of the NPT declares that all signatory states to the Treaty shall work towards complete nuclear disarmament “under strict and effective international control.” However, it certainly has been argued plenty of times in the past that the language of Article VI in particular, and the NPT more broadly, is vague and non-binding enough as to simply encourage member states to “negotiate in good faith,” and not to make measurable, verifiable progress on nonproliferation and towards disarmament.
This ambiguity in language, coupled with a lack of institutionalized enforcement mechanisms, makes working measurably towards disarmament very difficult. Witness North Korea’s development of civilian nuclear capabilities, achieved in complete legality under Article IV of the NPT, prior to the country’s withdrawal from the non-proliferation regime in 2003 to convert their technology from civilian to military use. Further, by claiming legitimacy to develop its nuclear program as a response to the failure of the recognized nuclear weapons states to uphold their obligations under the NPT, Iran has continued its progress towards realizing its nuclear ambition. And let's not even get into India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs, both developed in complete defiance of the international community's urging and of UN mandates.
So it seems a "voluntary" treaty like the NPT isn't good enough to anchor the global nonproliferation regime. So perhaps a more “mandatory” regime that relies heavily on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and that is backed by strict enforcement mechanisms, would ideally curb proliferation from aspiring nuclear countries and deter those countries on the brink from developing full-fledged nuclear weapons programs. Jack Garvey does a good job of breaking down a carefully-thought-out plan here. I highly recommend you check it out.
Chapter VII would basically constitute nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace, and under that definition, the UN Security Council would then have the international legal right and obligation to leverage diplomatic and, if necessary, military actions against states that pose a risk to international security.
So through the employment of Chapter VII, recognized nuclear weapons states would face more pressure to measurably and verifiably disarm, as failure to do so would incur severe penalties, including strict economic sanctions. In the meantime, states desiring to join the nuclear club would face the same threat of sanctions, as well as possible UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force, as justified under Chapter VII, since any actual or potential instance of nuclear proliferation would constitute a threat to the peace.
But while a formalized and “mandatory” regime endorsed and administered by the UN Security Council would be more effective than the current consensual regime, I think that alone would be insufficient. In tandem with a formal, institutionalized set of norms and laws, we also need ad hoc programs that can facilitate a quicker and freer flow of information, which can often allow action to be taken much more rapidly than if using proper channels. In short, ad hoc institutions are unburdened by the parameters of international organizations in nonproliferation efforts, and include, amongst others, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); the Cooperative Threat Reduction; and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
Here's a vivid recent example of the success of such measures: let's look at the role of the PSI in interdicting a shipment of uranium-enrichment equipment bound for Libya in 2003. Within a few months of the interdiction, and following secret talks amongst Libyan, American and British officials, Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi announced that he would no longer pursue a nuclear weapons program for his country. US officials were quick to cite the work of the PSI in inciting Libya to give up its nuclear ambitions; if that is true, then perhaps the reason the PSI was so effective is because generally, ad hoc mechanisms can enable military and diplomatic institutions to mobilize more quickly than would the structured, formal processes of the United Nations.
So a more "mandatory" architecture certainly would strengthen the nonproliferation regime in the following ways:
Article VI of the NPT declares that all signatory states to the Treaty shall work towards complete nuclear disarmament “under strict and effective international control.” However, it certainly has been argued plenty of times in the past that the language of Article VI in particular, and the NPT more broadly, is vague and non-binding enough as to simply encourage member states to “negotiate in good faith,” and not to make measurable, verifiable progress on nonproliferation and towards disarmament.
This ambiguity in language, coupled with a lack of institutionalized enforcement mechanisms, makes working measurably towards disarmament very difficult. Witness North Korea’s development of civilian nuclear capabilities, achieved in complete legality under Article IV of the NPT, prior to the country’s withdrawal from the non-proliferation regime in 2003 to convert their technology from civilian to military use. Further, by claiming legitimacy to develop its nuclear program as a response to the failure of the recognized nuclear weapons states to uphold their obligations under the NPT, Iran has continued its progress towards realizing its nuclear ambition. And let's not even get into India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs, both developed in complete defiance of the international community's urging and of UN mandates.
So it seems a "voluntary" treaty like the NPT isn't good enough to anchor the global nonproliferation regime. So perhaps a more “mandatory” regime that relies heavily on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and that is backed by strict enforcement mechanisms, would ideally curb proliferation from aspiring nuclear countries and deter those countries on the brink from developing full-fledged nuclear weapons programs. Jack Garvey does a good job of breaking down a carefully-thought-out plan here. I highly recommend you check it out.
Chapter VII would basically constitute nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace, and under that definition, the UN Security Council would then have the international legal right and obligation to leverage diplomatic and, if necessary, military actions against states that pose a risk to international security.
So through the employment of Chapter VII, recognized nuclear weapons states would face more pressure to measurably and verifiably disarm, as failure to do so would incur severe penalties, including strict economic sanctions. In the meantime, states desiring to join the nuclear club would face the same threat of sanctions, as well as possible UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force, as justified under Chapter VII, since any actual or potential instance of nuclear proliferation would constitute a threat to the peace.
But while a formalized and “mandatory” regime endorsed and administered by the UN Security Council would be more effective than the current consensual regime, I think that alone would be insufficient. In tandem with a formal, institutionalized set of norms and laws, we also need ad hoc programs that can facilitate a quicker and freer flow of information, which can often allow action to be taken much more rapidly than if using proper channels. In short, ad hoc institutions are unburdened by the parameters of international organizations in nonproliferation efforts, and include, amongst others, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); the Cooperative Threat Reduction; and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
Here's a vivid recent example of the success of such measures: let's look at the role of the PSI in interdicting a shipment of uranium-enrichment equipment bound for Libya in 2003. Within a few months of the interdiction, and following secret talks amongst Libyan, American and British officials, Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi announced that he would no longer pursue a nuclear weapons program for his country. US officials were quick to cite the work of the PSI in inciting Libya to give up its nuclear ambitions; if that is true, then perhaps the reason the PSI was so effective is because generally, ad hoc mechanisms can enable military and diplomatic institutions to mobilize more quickly than would the structured, formal processes of the United Nations.
So a more "mandatory" architecture certainly would strengthen the nonproliferation regime in the following ways:
- It would more forcefully deter nuclear would-be states from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities.
- It would lend a greater sense of legitimacy to the matter of proliferation by declaring the issue a threat to international peace under Chapter VII.
- It would change the negotiating game with targeted states and strengthen the effectiveness of IAEA inspection and verification measures.
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