This site examines the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War international security environment, which faces emerging and constantly evolving threats from state and non-state actors alike. Specific topics discussed include arms control; deterrence; civilian nuclear power; South Asian nuclear strategy and power balance; nuclear terrorism; and the role of the United States in nonproliferation.

4.05.2010

Looking Ahead to the Nuclear Security Summit

In exactly one week, President Obama is scheduled to host his highly-publicized and much-anticipated Nuclear Security Summit, which will bring together nearly fifty heads of state to discuss a forward-looking plan to strengthen the security of existing nuclear weapons, material and technology worldwide.

At the same time, this summit must fit into Obama's nuclear strategy agenda, which he outlined very neatly in his Prague speech exactly one year ago today. The strengthening of the current non-proliferation regime is high on that list, as are Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a follow-up agreement to replace START I. Happily, the latter has been achieved, and additional pressure will be put on the Senate to ratify the CTBT in the months leading up to mid-term congressional elections later this year.

So here are a few points which this writer, who had the very great honor to meet and speak with President Obama last week, would stress to the administration as the President and his staff prepare for this historic summit:
  1. Curbing the production and spread of fissile material -- Discuss openly the possibility of a universal and legally binding fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) that would help stymie the spread of the plutonium and uranium needed to construct nuclear or even dirty bombs.
  2. Don't let the India-US deal become a model -- Though the topic of the summit is nuclear security, that realm inevitably will provoke discussion on the global balance that must be struck between military nuclear capability and civilian nuclear power. The 2005 Indo-US nuclear cooperation deal was, from the beginning, a bad idea that must not become the precedent or standard in nuclear-related cooperation agreements.
  3. Arrange follow-up roundtable talks -- In the case of India and Pakistan, in particular, do not let this summit be the end of nuclear security discussions. Many conversations will need to be taken "off line," or to the side, and those discussions must be promoted and nurtured in similar multilateral arenas. Arrange to conduct additional talks with India and Pakistan together, along with related key players, to examine how the security of nuclear materials can best be enhanced, while curbing the transfer of illicit technology and expertise. Similar models can be set up for North Korea and Iran (though for the former, do not recreate a six-party-talk environment, as that initiative has met with severe roadblocks).
There are additional suggestions and things to keep in mind of course, but these are, in my opinion, some of the most important as President Obama prepares for this summit.

To the President: Best of luck next week.

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