This site examines the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War international security environment, which faces emerging and constantly evolving threats from state and non-state actors alike. Specific topics discussed include arms control; deterrence; civilian nuclear power; South Asian nuclear strategy and power balance; nuclear terrorism; and the role of the United States in nonproliferation.

4.22.2010

"We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state"

Reiterating its steadfast position regarding North Korea, its nuclear program and normalization of relations with Kim Jong-Il's regime, the US yesterday affirmed that it will not accede to demands from the DPRK that it be recognized globally as a nuclear-weapon state.

North Korea says it will recommit to the NPT and start working again on arms control measures towards disarmament -- as soon as the world accords it the status it feels it deserves.

So the simple answer would be to say, "OK, Kim, you're a nuclear weapons state. There you go. Now let's take those nukes off your hands." Right?

Wrong. Here are a few reasons why it isn't that simple:
  1. TRUST -- To put it bluntly, the world can't trust the DPRK. In the context of the Six-Party Talks, the North Korean negotiators have become very adept at dancing a delicate yet highly effective dance, in which they start trending towards the "positive" (for example, agreeing to allow inspectors back into Yongbyon), and then suddenly reverse momentum and go "negative" (for example, conducting an underground nuclear test). The DPRK is like a pendulum, except there is no way of telling when they will swing back the other way. You never know what to expect, so believing the North is hard.

  2. COMPLICATIONS -- The problem isn't that simple. There are lots of other factors to keep in mind, including but not limited to DPRK-ROK relations, economic aid and the lifting of trade barriers, and humanitarian relief. Recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state doesn't automatically mean that Russia, China, South Korea and Japan will automatically come to consensus on all these other issues. Which brings us to point 3:

  3. PERSPECTIVE -- To the DPRK, being granted a certain recognized status is a legitimate desire. Through the North Korean lens, having military nuclear capabilities means you get taken seriously on the world stage, and it isn't difficult to see why that is the sentiment there. The world's five recognized nuclear powers (US, UK, France, China, Russia) belong in the top 12 list of largest economies (by nominal GDP), and even India (#11), Israel (#40) and Pakistan (#45) are significantly more robust economically than North Korea (#88). So from North Korea's perspective, perhaps having nukes means more trade, more aid, and more credibility.

    This of course doesn't work for the other countries involved in the Six-Party talks, especially the US and its strongest allies, the ROK and Japan. They see a clear security concern, and the US has had to make numerous assurances regarding its defense of its allies through its extended "nuclear umbrella." Japan and the ROK, for their part, are concerned about the nuclear presence in North Korea, though for very different reasons.

    In short, every country (and I haven't even touched on China or Russia here) has a different perspective on giving North Korea what it demands.
There are additional reasons, if we dig deeper, why simply according North Korea nuclear-weapon status isn't going to address a major concern of the US (and, it can be argued, much of the world). But these three points are, I think, help illustrate just how complex the "North Korean situation" really is.

2 comments:

Alan P. Sanders said...

Interesting insight but doesn't the post really miss the point? NK is going to seek to develop its nuclear capabilities whether it is recognized as a nuclear power under the NPT or not. Isn't the real inquiry whether we are better off with a nuclear NK that has agreed to stick to the rules of the NPT than one which is constantly hiding and obscuring key information?

And while I think point 2 is insightful - I fail to see how it is related to the issue. Of course the NPT issue doesn't resolve trade issues. But who claimed they would? It seems like a red herring and not logically connected to your argument. Perhaps the author could edit the post and make the link slightly more clear?

As for point 3 - recognition under the NPT doesn't increase how seriously you are taken. If you have a nuclear weapon, you are taken seriously whether you are signed on to the NPT or not. I think this points to another question - is NK's real goal to legitimize its nuclear goals and therefore get rid of a hurdle to rejoining the world community? Who knows - but I think that is the real question that needs to be asked.

Well done on the post. Looking forward to more.

Rizwan said...

Thanks, Alan, for your thoughts as always. I'd be happy to clarify. And just to get this out of the way, I put this article up rather quickly so didn't expand (especially on point 2) as much as I should have. For that I apologize.

First, the question here is not about whether North Korea could ever join the NPT. The question is why the official US foreign policy line has never formally and overtly acknowledged North Korea's nuclear weapons capability. By the way, Secretary Clinton just broke with tradition a week or two ago and said in a press conference something along the lines of, "Yeah of course DPRK has nukes, something something, etc." Though this was not actually a strategic move -- she took the filter off for a second and made a mistake.

So to clarify point 2: one of the toughest things about the North Korean issue, from an international policy standpoint, is this matter of linkages. The Six-Party talks have tried to implement a set of conditions that can be made -- tradeoffs, if you will -- to entice the DPRK to give up its nuclear ambitions. For example: "Make progress on denuclearization and we'll lift sanctions." Or: "Open up your facilities to IAEA inspections and we'll send in massive humanitarian aid."

It's important to note that in both of these examples, which do parallel real-life initiatives that have largely failed, "we" is meant to indicate the international community (specifically the other five countries in 6PT), but in actuality it's all underpinned by the US. With that said, Washington can't do it alone. Especially when it comes to financial aid (ROK and China are HUGE contributors to keeping the North Korean market afloat), the US needs help.

So what the US says, and what official status it gives to North Korea regarding its nuclear program, is pretty critical because the solution isn't as easy as saying, "OK, fine. We recognize you as a nuclear weapons state. Now let's make some progress." It's significantly more complicated because of these issue linkages.

And point 3: again, nothing about recognition within NPT. I think most people would agree that's pretty much never going to happen. DPRK join the global regime? You've gotta be kidding me. That's about as likely as Israel actually openly declaring their nuclear arsenal. Just not going to happen.

No, this article is really about the US, and why it has (only until recently, and even that was a slip of the tongue) never explicitly declared North Korea to be a nuclear power. With that said, I think we might be saying the same thing: when people recognize you as a nuke state, you're taken seriously. There's a reason the US refuses to make this public recognition: North Korea should by no means be taken seriously.

Thanks as always for the feedback, and I hope this helps!